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Abstract
This is a study about political participation and the influence that local con­
texts have on citizens’ participatory habits. The question of why some people 
participate in politics while others do not has spawned a rich body of research. 
While varied in its scope and focus, the bulk of the empirical studies of polit­
ical participation, and indeed the major theoretical accounts of participation, 
center on individual-level characteristics. Previous research has illustrated the 
importance of factors such as income, education and other sociodemographic 
and attitudinal variables in explanations of political participation. However, 
even after controlling for these, there still exists significant variation in partic­
ipation across communities. That is, beyond the effect that the characteristics 
of individuals have on participation, different aspects of the social and political 
environment in which individuals operate, have an effect on their behavior.
In this thesis it is argued that the social and political environment struc­
tures incentives for participation in several ways. The institutional and social 
character of a person’s community has a direct effect on their political behav­
ior. Community-level factors also affect political participation indirectly. While 
there is good evidence that individual-level characteristics in the form of re­
sources, motivation and mobilization drive political participation, this thesis 
argues that the effects of these are mediated by the institutional and social con­
text within which individuals find themselves. The study also makes a case for 
treating different forms of political participation separately. It is argued that 
the contextual factors explored in the thesis have varying effects on individual
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types of participation.
In order to test these arguments, the thesis analyzes the effects of commu­
nity racial diversity, local government institutions and social capital on both 
electoral and nonelectoral political participation in American cities. The data 
used for this study come from several sources. Individual-level survey data 
come from the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark survey—a survey 
of close to 30,000 individuals across the United States. Respondents to this 
survey are matched with sociodemographic data on their place of residence and 
information on local government finances from the United States Census and 
the Census of Governments as well as data from the International City/County 
Management Association’s Municipal Form of Government survey, containing 
information on the form and size of local government, provisions for direct 
democracy and local electoral rules among others. Combined, these sources 
of data provide information on roughly 15,000 individuals nested in over 1000 
cities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
11
1 .1  I n t r o d u c t io n
This is a study about political participation and the influence that local con­
texts have on citizens’ participatory habits. Political participation, as Verba, 
Schlozman & Brady put it, is in many ways “at the heart of democracy” (1995, 
1). By taking political action, citizens make their political preferences known, 
determine who holds public office and try to influence the decisions made by 
politicians. The question of why some people participate in politics while oth­
ers do not has spawned a rich body of research. While varied in its scope and 
focus, the bulk of the empirical studies of political participation, and indeed the 
major theoretical accounts of participation, center on individual-level charac­
teristics (Rosenstone h  Hansen 1994, 2-3). While important, focussing solely 
on characteristics of individuals leaves out many important factors and fails to 
explain certain patterns of political participation. Among these are changes in 
participation over time and differences in participation across space.1 I focus 
my attention on the latter.
A consistent finding among previous studies of political participation in the 
United States and elsewhere is that characteristics of people—such as their level 
of education, income and occupation—have a strong impact on whether they 
participate in politics or not. It is generally widely accepted that individuals 
of higher socio-economic status (SES), for instance, participate at higher rates 
than others. However, participation does not only vary between individuals, 
there are also differences across locations. That is, beyond the effect that the 
characteristics of individuals have on participation, different aspects of the social 
and political environment in which individuals operate, have an effect on their 
behavior. So it is not the case that similar individuals—say, white, high SES
1 Focusing on individuals’ socio-economic status as the central explanation for political 
participation leaves some puzzling questions unanswered. Levels of education, for example, 
have risen steadily in the post-War United States, yet political participation has been on the 
decline during the same period.
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males—necessarily participate in the same ways or to the same extent regardless 
of where they live. It is this inter-community variation in political participation 
that is the focus of this thesis. W hat community-level factors can help account 
for the variation in political participation across locations after controlling for 
individual-level characteristics? And related to this, how does context interact 
with individual-level factors to influence political behavior?
In order to answer these questions, I examine political participation in Amer­
ican communities. Studying political behavior in the context of urban America 
is fruitful for a number of reasons. Despite popular conceptions of the United 
States as a vast wasteland of apathetic and apolitical citizens, the reality is 
that Americans are participants. As Verba, Schlozman & Brady note, while it 
is true that voter turnout is lower in the US than in many other democracies, 
Americans are generally more likely to contact politicians and officials, work on 
a campaign, belong to and be active in political groups and participate in local 
politics than citizens in other countries (1995, 91). This civic tradition has a 
long history; as Alexis de Tocqueville famously noted, Americans of the early 
nineteenth century stood apart in their willingness to form and participate in 
all manner of voluntary associations from sports and hobby clubs to cultural 
and religious groups (Tocqueville 1969 [1832]).
If Americans themselves are good subjects for the study of participation, 
the communities in which they live provide an excellent arena for analyzing 
the effects of political and social context on that participation. On the one 
hand, there exists a great deal of variation when it comes to local political 
institutions such as electoral and representative systems, the services provided 
by local government, their size and powers, as well as in the social composition 
of communities. On the other hand, with seventy-percent of Americans living 
in urban areas, local governments are of substantive political importance as well 
(US Department of Commerce (Census Bureau) 2002, 33). Some of the most
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contentious issues in contemporary American politics—such as debates over 
school prayer, regulation of the institution of marriage (Rahn k  Rudolph 2001) 
and conflicts over the teaching of evolution in schools (Bhattacharjee 2005, 
Holden 2005)—are played out at the local level. Local governments are also of 
economic importance. Primary and secondary education is the largest category 
of direct public expenditure, aside from defense, and the budgets for these areas 
are controlled by local governments (Romer k  Rsenthal 1979, US Department of 
Commerce (Census Bureau) 2000a). Moreover, an increasing number of services 
and programs axe being devolved from the federal level to the states and local 
governments (Cigler 1998, 60-2). Thus elections to city councils and the boards 
of counties, special districts and school districts matter. When it comes to 
nonelectoral forms of political participation, the reasons to study the local level 
are even more apparent. If one considers the ways citizens can participate 
politically outside elections—by protesting, belonging to and being active in 
political groups, contacting politicians or officials—they are more often than not 
local. People get involved because they oppose the building of a local highway, 
want to influence their children’s school or are concerned about crime in their 
neighborhood. Even when participation is directed at the state or federal level, 
as when people campaign in elections, the citizen is still a member of a local 
campaign committee or political group. Increasing our understanding of how 
differences in local context influence political action is an important element of 
the larger question of the determinants of political participation in general.
1 .2  D e f in in g  P o l it ic a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n
The ways in which people can get involved in politics—express preferences over 
political issues or try to influence the direction of policy or the distribution
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of public resources—are many and varied. As such, there is no consensus on 
what constitutes political participation. It is hard to disagree that voting is 
a political act, it is less clear, however, if participating in the Parent Teacher 
Association (PTA) or being involved with the Salvation Army is. Some studies 
have confined themselves to defining political participation as voting in elec­
tions (Blais & Dobrzynska 1998, Franklin 1996, Franklin 2004, Jackman &; 
Miller 1995, Lijphart 1997); while on the other extreme, certain researchers 
call for a an almost all-inclusive definition of what constitutes political partic­
ipation, arguing that virtually all human interaction and action is political by 
its very nature (Mansbridge 1993, Prokhovnik 1998) . Within this spectrum 
lies a wide range of what can be considered political participation. Rosenstone 
& Hansen note that past work in this field has tended to focus on a limited 
definition of political participation as being concerned with “the selection of 
government personnel and the actions they take” (1994, 4). This definition is 
limiting as it does not include actions that, while political in nature, are not 
necessarily aimed at government personnel or the actions of governments and 
their bureaucracies—such as actions to change consumer behavior or campaigns 
to alter the distribution of social goods that do not involve government action, 
for instance. For this reason Rosenstone & Hansen adopt a definition that 
is more expansive: “Political participation is action directed explicitly toward 
influencing the distribution of social goods and social values” (1994, 4).
In this study I am somewhat restricted by the questions included in the sur­
vey I use—the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey. At the same time, 
I also want to make a clear distinction between participation that is political, 
on the one hand, and what could be called civic, or non-political voluntary par­
ticipation, on the other hand. Nevertheless, I follow Rosenstone and Hansen’s 
lead in that I am concerned with action that is aimed at politicians and policy 
directly and also that which is political in a wider meaning, in the sense that
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it is directed at affecting “the distribution of social goods and social values” 
(Rosenstone & Hansen 1994, 4). Specifically, the five indicators of political 
participation analyzed in this thesis axe:
• voting in the 1996 presidential election
• signing petitions
• attending political meetings or rallies
• participating in demonstrations or boycotts
•  being active in a political group
In choosing these five indicators, an attem pt has been made to limit myself 
to actions that are as explicitly political as possible. This means that other 
forms of participation that some may argue are political in nature have been 
excluded—examples of these include such things are being active in the PTA; 
participating in a veterans’ or ethnic group; involvement in a union; writing 
letters to the editor. The list of actions I have included in the analysis also 
excludes measures of political knowledge, political interest and regular news­
paper readership which are sometimes conceived of as political engagement 
(Norris 2003, Saguaro Seminar 2001). Here it is not clear, however, if these 
acts are political participation in and of themselves, or if they are causes of 
political participation.2 Moreover, according to the definition I adopt, political 
participation is seen as an action—being knowledgeable or interested in politics 
is not by itself active (Parry, Moyser & Day 1992). Many studies of political 
action also analyze other forms of political participation including various forms 
of contacting politicians and officials; donating money or time to political cam­
paigns; persuading others to participate in politics. These acts fit what I would
2Political knowledge and political interest could be considered consequences of political 
participation. That is, it is not clear whether people have some knowledge about politics and 
then decide to get active, or if they make the decision to participate and then decide to gather 
information in order to make a better political choice.
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consider to be political participation, however, they were not included in the 
Benchmark survey, and therefore cannot be included in the study.
Decisions about how to operationalize political participation carry with them 
implications for the arguments and conclusions researchers are able to draw 
about the concept. When studies of political participation look at multiple 
indicators of participation, they often proceed by creating indexes of participa­
tion and then analyzing these scales in one model. Verba, Schlozman h  Brady 
(1995), for example, use an eight point additive scale consisting of various polit­
ical acts to examine overall participation. By doing so, they are able to answer 
questions about what factors influence whether individuals participate in many, 
a few or no political acts. However, such an empirical strategy ignores important 
differences between modes of participation and makes it impossible to examine 
if, and in what ways, different factors have variable effects on the probability of 
engaging in separate forms of participation. Clearly many indicators of political 
participation are related to each other to some extent. As the correlation matrix 
in the appendix illustrates, the five forms of political participation analyzed in 
this thesis are no exception. Nevertheless, there are important particularities 
that necessitate analyzing individual indicators in separate models.
Some forms of political participation, like voting or contacting a public of­
ficial, are more individualistic in character, while others, such as being active 
in a political campaign or participating in a protest, are more social in their 
nature. Moreover, some political acts are more consensual than others. Put 
differently, certain forms of political action, such protesting or activity in some 
political groups, are the result of—or related to—higher levels of social and 
political conflict. Voting and activity in political parties are also intimately 
related to the political system; other forms of participation are less so. Related 
to this is the fact that the act of voting is entirely dependent on the political 
calendar—one can’t vote unless there is an election—and then an individual has
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one vote. The volume of activity in other forms of political participation, on 
the other hand, is not restricted in the same way. Finally, the five indicators 
of political participation analyzed in this thesis also differ as to their intensity. 
That is, some are simply less costly to engage in than others. Because of these 
differences, I expect various explanatory variables to affect the indicators dif­
ferently and, therefore, analyzing each one individually is preferable to building 
an index.
1 .3  P u t t in g  P o l it ic a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n  in  C o n t e x t
The title of this thesis alludes to “community effects” on political participa­
tion. How community is defined will obviously have important consequences 
for the kinds of effects that are uncovered. At the same time, there are myriad 
contextual characteristics that can exert influence on how people take part in 
politics. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the analysis to a few salient factors 
of the social and political environment. The following sections lay out what I 
mean by community in this thesis—that is, how context is defined—as well as 
the specific contextual characteristics I focus on in subsequent chapters.
1.3.1 D e f in i n g  C o m m u n i t y
The existing literature dealing with contextual effects on political behavior em­
ploys a variety of contextual units of analysis. Some work looks at very small 
entities such as neighborhoods (Gimpel, Dyck & Shaw 2004, Johnston, Prop- 
per, Sarker, Jones, Bolster & Burgess 2004, Oliver & Mendelberg 2000) or even 
discussion groups (Mutz 2002), others focus on larger geographic areas such 
as cities or counties (Branton h  Jones 2005, Hajnal & Lewis 2003, Kelleher & 
Lowery 2004, Oliver 2001). There are also studies using the state or provin­
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cial level (Johnston k  Soroka 2001). In addition, there is of course a vast 
literature making cross-national comparisons which, at least implicitly, makes 
arguments about context, albeit on a very large scale (Franklin 2004, Inglehart 
1990, Norris 2004, Powell 1982). Given that I am interested in political partic­
ipation, it makes sense to settle on a contextual unit that is large enough to be 
politically relevant and at the same time provides as much variation as possible, 
in social and political environment—something larger than a neighborhood but 
clearly smaller than the state level.
Table 1.1: Local Governments in the United States0
Type of Government Number
County 3,043
Municipal 19,431
Township 16,506
Special District 35,356
School District 13,522
Total 87,849
°  Source: US Bureau of the Census. 2002. Census of 
Governments.
As table 1.1 makes clear, the system of American local government is com­
plex with close to 88,000 local government units, sometimes having overlapping 
jurisdictions. Local governments are organized by three basic units: town or 
township, county, and city (referring to all municipalities). However, which 
of these is strongest varies by region. In the New England states, towns and 
cities are the most important form of local government while counties in these 
states have few if any governmental responsibilities. Throughout the rest of 
the northeastern United States (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) and 
the upper midwest (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota) towns or townships, 
cities, boroughs, and counties all provide various governmental functions. In 
the remainder of the United States, counties and cities provide the basic units
of local government with strength vis-a-vis each other varying depending on 
state. In other words, in some states cities operate almost independently of 
the counties in which they are located—Texas, for instance, has weak counties, 
with few governmental services and powers, and strong cities. In other states, 
cities are very dependent on the counties in which they are located. In addi­
tion, special districts and school districts also provide services and levy taxes 
(Burns 1994, Ostrom, Bish Sz Ostrom 1988, 3-9). This complexity in local gov­
ernment organization raises issues about the proper geographical unit of analysis 
for this study.
One approach, employed in Oliver’s (2001) work on civic engagement and 
suburbanization, is to use metropolitan areas. This presents several difficulties 
however. Metropolitan areas are defined by the US Census Bureau using coun­
ties as the building blocks; large metropolitan areas will contain multiple coun­
ties and in some cases will cross state lines (US Department of Commerce (Cen­
sus Bureau) 20006). As such, some metropolitan areas contain many cities, some 
contain few—the number depends on size of metropolitan area and region of the 
United States, municipal incorporation being a function of state law and local 
preference. Using counties, on the other hand, provides a seamless geography 
that covers most of the country. The drawback to counties is that they do not 
provide a very a high degree of variation on many of the independent variables 
of interest. Therefore, I use the city as my contextual unit of analysis in this the­
sis. Cities vary to a much greater degree than counties when it comes to form of 
governance, local government services and taxation and spending. Specifically, 
I use two Census defined geographic divisions: place and city. A place consists 
of “an incorporated place with an active government and definite geographic 
boundaries such as a city, town, or village” (Marketing Systems Group 2004). 
Up until the 2000 Census, the Census only enumerated areas with populations 
over 2500 as place—beginning with the 2000 Census, this restriction has been
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removed (US Department of Commerce (Census Bureau) 20006). A city as de­
fined by the US Census, “refers to incorporated places with a 1990 population 
of 25,000 or more” (US Department of Commerce (Census Bureau) 2000c, 2). 
The reason for using both of these geographies is a practical one. For some 
of the analyses presented here, I use contextual data only available for the city 
level. This includes data on local government spending, taxation and unemploy­
ment. One result of this is that the number of contextual units—the number of 
cities—is not the same in all analyses. Another reason for different sample sizes 
at the city level is the existence of missing data on some variables at this level. 
Instead of using that same restricted dataset for all the models, I have chosen 
to maximize the number of cases included by using the most inclusive dataset 
whenever possible. Therefore I use the place level when feasible, yielding larger 
numbers of both individual and city level samples.
1 .3 .2  C o n t e x t u a l  C h a r a c t e r is t i c s
As Burns (1994, 7-16) and Oliver (1997, 10-11) note, local governments and 
their boundaries are often the result of local political and economic interests 
which in turn institutionalize both political and social differences. So, not only 
is there a large number of local government bodies, they also differ in crucial 
respects along myriad dimensions. Cities range in size, for example, from the 
smallest village with only a few hundred inhabitants to New York City which 
is bursting with a population of over eight million. There are clearly more 
dimensions differentiating cities from one another than there is space to analyze 
them in this thesis. Therefore, I narrow my focus to three features:
•  community diversity
• government competencies
•  social capital.
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These three characteristics have been chosen partly because they are particu­
larly salient differentiating features of cities and partly because differences along 
these dimensions can be hypothesized to be important predictors of political 
participation.
Cities in the United States differ to a great extent socially—in terms of 
racial and ethnic diversity and socio-economic status. Among the most striking 
aspects of contemporary American society is its diversity. As the 2000 census 
confirms, America is more multicultural than ever. How does this diversity ef­
fect political participation? Past research suggests that more homogenous places 
should have higher levels of participation because people will be more likely to 
invest in their communities when they share values and preferences with others 
around them (Alesina Sz La Ferrera 2000, 850). However, the preference con­
gruence that Alesina Sz La Ferrera (2000), Costa Sz Kahn (2003) and others cite 
as characteristic of homogenous places could be hypothesized to depress levels 
of participation. In more diverse communities where there is a wider spread of 
preferences, there will also likely be more conflict over resource allocation and 
policy in general. This conflict makes it more likely that groups will mobilize 
which ought to lead to increased participation. In other words, in more diverse 
places the stakes are higher, creating incentives for participation.
Cities in the United States vary to a startling degree in how their polit­
ical institutions are organized and in what they do for their citizens. Some 
cities operate under mayor-council systems, others use a council-manager sys­
tem and still others have an appointed commission that runs city government. 
Electoral rules also differ between cities. Most notably, local elections in many 
cities in the United States are non-partisan. How citizens are represented by 
local governments differs widely as well with councillors being elected at-large 
or from single-member districts. In the wake of the reform-era, many state 
and local governments adopted various provisions for direct democracy result­
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ing in citizens of some communities being able to influence local politics through 
referendums, petitions, initiatives and recalls. All of these institutional differ­
ences can be summarized as affecting the openness of the local political system. 
Openness here is a function of such characteristics as single-member districts, 
provisions for direct democracy, mayor-council systems and partisan elections. 
Local governments that are more open create more opportunities for political 
participation.
Not only do the political institutions of cities differ, but the services local 
governments provide as well as levels of expenditures and taxation vary as well. 
Some cities provide an extensive range of services—everything from police pro­
tection, mass transit, hospitals and airports to schools and sanitation—while 
others provide virtually no services. Similarly, cities differ to a great extent 
in how much, and for what, they tax their residents. A rational choice the­
ory of participation would suggest that individuals living in places where local 
government matters more will be more likely to go the polls or express their pref­
erences in other ways, than their counterparts living in cities with less active 
governments.
Finally, the focus of much of the recent research on political and civic en­
gagement in the United States has been on the apparent decline of participation 
in the post-World War II era. Discussions of low and declining levels of political 
participation in America are not new. Lately however, the issue has been in­
creasingly coupled with discussions about lower levels of social capital and civic 
engagement in general, with a steady stream of journal articles, books and me­
dia coverage following Putnam (1995 a, 19956, 2000). When it comes to political 
participation, the argument from the social capitalists is twofold. One line of 
argument is that activity in voluntary (non-political) associations infuses mem­
bers with attitudes and values such as norms of reciprocity and trust (Fuchs, 
Minnite & Shapiro 2000, Putnam 2000). These, it is said, are precisely the
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attitudes necessary for political participation—active people are exposed to and 
develop participatory norms. Second, the social capital literature contends that 
non-political networks act as recruitment forces on individuals who, lacking this 
mobilization, would be less likely to participate in politics. Verba, Schlozman 
& Brady have further argued that the skills and resources required for politi­
cal participation axe gained through activity in non-political institutions (1995, 
267-73). The social capital argument is essentially a contextual argument. The 
“civic culture” of a place—as determined by the levels of social capital in that 
place—is argued to have an impact on individual political behavior. In other 
words, according to this theory, differences in political participation between 
communities should be accounted for to a great extent by inter-community dif­
ferences in social capital.
1 .4  D a t a
The convoluted nature of American local government has led to difficulties in 
studying political participation and these difficulties have been exacerbated by 
the lack of data on participation in sub-national units. Most of the studies in 
this field have used data from nationally representative samples. When surveys 
of this kind are used and they include questions about participation in local 
politics, it is possible to examine in general why some people take action and 
others do not. For instance, as Rahn & Rudolph (2001, 5) point out, one 
could draw some conclusions about why home owners might be more likely to 
participate or why less educated individuals would be less likely to. However, 
the problem with most nationally representative samples is that they have been 
designed to analyze individual-level characteristics and as such, more often than 
not, contain too few higher-level units—cities, neighborhoods, communities,
24
Congressional Districts or whatever the unit of interest may be—to allow for 
meaningful inferences to be drawn about differences across places.
Stoker & Bowers (2002, 244-8) convincingly illustrate how increasing the 
number of higher-level units has a much more dramatic impact on the power of 
analyses than increasing the number of individuals sampled does. As Snijders 
h  Bosker (1999, 140) put it:
A relevant general remark is that the sample size at the highest level 
is usually the most restrictive element in the design. For example, a 
two- level design with 10 groups, i.e. a macro-level sample size of 10, 
is at least as uncomfortable as a single-level design with a sample 
size of 10. Requirements on the sample size at the highest level, 
for a hierarchical linear model with q explanatory variables at this 
level, are at least as stringent as requirements on the sample size in 
a single level design with q explanatory variables.
Thus, if one wants to analyze both individual and contextual effects on individ­
ual behavior, a dataset that combines both micro and macro factors while also 
containing data from enough higher-level units is required. The recently avail­
able Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey allows a more systematic 
study the effects of contextual variables on behavior. In addition to a nation­
ally representative sample of 3003 respondents, the survey also includes respon­
dents from fortyone different subnational representative samples. These samples 
had varying geographical boundaries including states and regions within states 
(some were at the county level, some at the city level and some at other regional 
levels determined by the local community foundation funding the project in each 
area). The total sample size for the combined surveys is 29,733. Through an 
agreement with the Roper Center I was able to obtain detailed geocodes for the 
data, enabling me to identify respondents’ places of residence. Using the Fed­
eral Information Processing Standards (FIPS) codes (the unique identification
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code used by the US Census Bureau to identify every place in Untied States) re­
spondents were sorted into their city of residence regardless of what sub-sample 
they belonged to originally, thereby avoiding the sometimes awkward sampling 
geographies determined by the sponsors. I have then matched respondents to 
the survey with data about their place of residence from the US Census and 
US Census of Governments contained in the County and City Data Book (US 
Department of Commerce (Census Bureau) 1994) as well as data from the In­
ternational City/County Management Association’s (ICMA) Municipal Form 
of Government survey, which contains information on the form and size of lo­
cal government, provisions for direct democracy and local electoral rules among 
others.
There are several sources of missing data in this study. First, some cases are 
missing because respondents refused to provide their place of residence. How­
ever, very few respondents—380—actually failed to provide enough information 
to identify where they live, making this form of missingness relatively benign. 
Second, the number of cases in the study is also reduced due to the fact that 
not all respondents live in census-defined cities. On the one hand, this is an 
acceptable loss of cases given that I am predominantly interested in hypotheses 
that relate to urban rather than rural settings. Furthermore, a great deal of 
the city-level data that I employ is not readily available (if at all) for smaller 
geographic areas. However, I do want to be careful not to bias my estimates 
through truncation.3
Third, there are as is often the case with survey data, also a number of 
cases at the individual level that have missing data on some items due to non-
3I conducted a simple test to determine whether, or to what extent, this reduction in 
sample size biases the results. Using the full sample of 29,733 I created a dummy variable 
that took the value 1 if the case was excluded and 0 if the case was included in the reduced 
dataset. I then ran a logit regression on this variable using all the sociodemographic indicators 
as well as the dependent variables that I use in later analyses. While most of the coefficients 
were insignificant, it does appear that white respondents and people who are in the top income 
brackets are slightly more likely to be excluded from the final sample.
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response. This form of missing data is less random and needs to be addressed in 
a way other than the common strategy of deleting cases; a strategy that certainly 
leads to biased results and a loss of power in the analysis due to less information 
once cases have been discarded (King, Honacher, Joseph & Scheve 2001, 49). 
Instead of deleting cases—either listwise or pairwise—one can impute values for 
the missing data. Using Schafer’s (1999) multiple imputation software, NORM  
I imputed values for the missing individual-level data, creating 5 complete data 
sets on which subsequent analyses were carried out.4
4Imputation involves “filling in” missing data with plausible values. When imputing we are 
making a guess as to the values of the missing data, so the standard errors from any analyses 
which use such imputed data will be too small—since they do not include this “guessing”. 
Therefore, one needs to make several imputations. Multiple imputation provides the extra 
variation needed to account for the uncertainty about the imputed values. This approach 
involves imputing m values for each missing value, creating m complete data sets on which 
the analysis is carried out. Estimates from each dataset are then combined using methods 
described by (Rubin 1987).
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Chapter 2
Individual-Level Determ inants 
of Political Participation
28
2 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
As outlined in the introduction, this thesis argues that people’s propensity for 
taking political action is influenced in large part by the social and political 
environment in which they find themselves. Explanations of differences in par­
ticipation across communities that look only at differences in the composition 
of the population of those communities will be incomplete. Because, as I show 
in section 4 of this chapter, political participation varies significantly across 
cities even after controlling for individual-level variables, any explanation of po­
litical participation should also include institutional, city-level factors. Having 
said that, it would be naive to think that differences in political participation 
rates can be chalked up to differences in environment alone. Individual par­
ticipants differ from non-participants in several important ways. One of the 
strongest findings in past work on political participation—especially turnout— 
is that individuals with higher socio-economic status (SES) participate more 
than those from low SES groups (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, Verba & 
Nie 1972, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). Recent work has also focused on age 
as an important factor in determining turnout as well as nonelectoral partici­
pation (Blais 2000, 49-52)(Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980, 37-60) and race and 
gender are often cited as key variables in explaining differences in political be­
havior between individuals (Burns, Schlozman & Verba 2001, 25-9). Therefore, 
it is important to first outline and specify an individual-level model of political 
participation before differences across locations can be analyzed.
The chapter proceeds by first exploring the extent of activity in the five 
different acts of political participation discussed in the previous chapter. The 
extent of participation in the contemporary United States is set in comparative 
perspective in order to determine the relative level of activity; do the levels of 
engagement reported by respondents to the Benchmark survey represent a lot 
or participation or a little? The amount of political participation engaged in by
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Americans is compared to the volume of non-political activity, political activity 
in the past and political activity in other democracies. Section three presents 
some descriptive statistics and bivariate relationships illustrating differences in 
activity rates between individuals of different SES, age and racial groups. Fi­
nally, I turn to a multi-level model in which I first determine the extent of 
variation in political participation across American cities and then assess how 
much of this variation is accounted for by individual-level factors.
2 .2  T h e  E x t e n t  o f  P o l it ic a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n
Figure 2.1 details the percentage of respondents to the Benchmark survey who 
reported having taken part in various political acts.1 Just over three quarters 
of respondents to the survey reported having taken part in at least one of these 
forms of political participation. There exits a large degree of variation across the 
five indicators. Not surprisingly, voting is the most common political act with 
roughly 73% of respondents reporting that they voted in the 1996 presidential 
election. The data in Figure 2.1 contain important information about the dif­
ferences in types of political participation and begin to point to some potential 
factors that make it possible for individuals to participate; or put differently, 
some potential barriers that may make it less likely that people take political 
action.
When looking at the proportion of people engaging in forms of political 
participation other than voting, it is apparent that the more intense, more costly, 
ways of participating are less frequently engaged in. Some 37% of respondents 
reported having signed a petition during the previous year. Putting one’s name 
on a petition requires that one is at least somewhat committed to a cause. It is
still, however, a relatively low-cost activity given that usually someone will come
1See Appendix A.l for complete question wordings.
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Figure 2.1: Political activities
to the door or one will be stopped on the street; it is rare that a person would 
seek out a petition to sign. Indeed, signing a petition is the second most common 
political act and twice as frequent as the next type of activity. The final three 
forms of participation—attending political rallies; demonstrating; and being 
active in a political group—are characterized by more commitment and higher 
costs to the participant. It is fair to say that it takes more commitment to an 
issue or political cause to compel an individual to find out about and attend 
a rally than it does to vote. The costs to the participant when it comes to 
demonstrations or boycotts is perhaps even higher given that demonstrations 
may be illegal and potentially violent and boycotts entail changing consumption 
behavior. Being active in a political group takes time and often money. The 
proportion of respondents engaging in these acts is considerably lower than in 
less intense forms of participation with 18% reporting they had attended a rally,
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10% had participated in a political group and only 8% of respondents reported 
having been active in a demonstration or boycott.
Voting stands out among these forms of political action in that it is wholly 
dependent on the political system. That is, a citizen cannot vote unless it 
is election day and they can only vote once during an election cycle. It is 
possible for people to “multiply” their activity in the other forms of participation 
presented here; an individual can sign as many petitions or attend as many 
rallies as they wish and have time for (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, 46). 
Unfortunately the Benchmark survey did not ask about the number of times 
respondents engaged in various acts—how many petitions they signed, rallies 
they attended and so on—therefore it is not possible to explore the volume of 
participation; only if an individual participated or not. However, it is possible 
to examine the number of different political acts individuals engaged in. Figure 
2.2—illustrating the number of political acts engaged in by respondents to the 
Benchmark survey—shows that over three quarters of people took part in only 
one or two acts—84.1%. The mean number of acts engaged in by the sample 
is 1.5. The most common political act by far for these people is voting. The 
dominance of voting as a way to exercise political voice is underscored by the 
fact that less than 30% of respondents who did not vote, participated in some 
other political act. Voting clearly makes it more likely that one also takes part 
in other forms of political activity.
As Verba and his co-authors note, there is no clear-cut way of determining 
whether numbers such as those reported above represent a lot of participation 
or a little, (1995, 68). However, following their lead, setting these figures in a 
comparative perspective can shed some light on whether Americans’ engagement 
in politics is relatively high or low (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, Ch. 3).
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Figure 2.2: Mean number of political acts
2.2.1 C o m p a r in g  P o l it ic a l  a n d  N o n - P o l it ic a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n
One place to start a comparison of the extent of political participation is to 
contrast it with the amount of non-political participation. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Americans have a long tradition of joining and being active in 
myriad associations, clubs and religious congregations. Despite some accounts 
of a serious decline in non-political participation in the United States (see espe­
cially Putnam 2000), Americans are still very active in all manner of voluntary 
associations and groups. Figure 2.3 presents data on secular non-political en­
gagement and illustrates that Americans are in fact very active in non-political 
groups and associations. Just over three quarters of respondents to the Bench­
mark survey—76.9%—had been involved with a non-political group of one kind 
or another. However, much of this “activity” may be nothing more than paying 
the membership dues for Amnesty International or contributing a few dollars to
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Figure 2.3: Activity in secular non-political groups
the United Way. Indeed the largest percentage of respondents reported being 
involved with a charity or welfare organisation. Nevertheless, a considerable 
number of Americans do invest time in such groups as Parent Teacher Associ­
ations, the local Little League or hobby groups. Much of the theory of social 
capital rests on the importance of these kinds of voluntary, non-political, asso­
ciations. Putnam and others, argue it is through membership and activity in 
these so-called secondary associations that the norms of reciprocity, trust and 
cooperation so important—it is claimed—for well-functioning societies, are fos­
tered (Putnam 1993, Putnam 2000, Stolle 1999). I deal with the question of the 
nature and outcomes of social capital at length in Chapter 5 but it should be 
said that the evidence for these connections is less than clear cut.
Figure 2.3 is of course not an exhaustive list of the ways in which people can 
be non-politically active. Volunteering, giving to charity and religious activity
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have all historically been important in American society (Putnam 2000, Skocpol 
1999, Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, Wuthnow 1999).
2 .2 .2  P a r t ic ip a t io n  P a s t  a n d  P r e s e n t
Much has been made of the perceived decline in political participation—both 
electoral and nonelectoral—as well as non-political civic engagement in the 
United States in the period since the 1950s. Putnam (2000) famously charts the 
downward trend of myriad indicators of engagement—everything from voting to 
participation in voluntary associations to socializing with friends and bowling in 
leagues. Rosenstone & Hansen focus specifically on political participation and 
find that engagement in both electoral and nonelectoral participation has de­
clined across the range of indicators they look at (1994, 56-70). While Putnam 
(2000) and others have lamented the decline of participation, it is not obvious 
that there in fact has been such a marked drop. McDonald & Popkin (2001) 
for instance, make a compelling argument that the way in which turnout is 
measured in the vast majority of studies on the United States is flawed and sig­
nificantly underestimates actual turnout. Measuring turnout as the percentage 
of the voting age population that casts a ballot means that a number of peo­
ple are included in the denominator of the turnout rate that are not actually 
eligible to vote. These include prisoners, the mentally incompetent and non­
citizens. McDonald &; Popkin (2001, 965-8) show that the decline in turnout 
that began with the 1972 election is largely an artifact created by using the 
incorrect denominator. They argue that it is the ineligible population that has 
increased rather than the voting population that has decreased. If one uses the 
“voting-eligible population” as the denominator of the turnout rate, McDonald 
h  Popkin argue that the only pattern emerging is an increase in turnout in 
southern congressional races (2001, 967).
Figure 2.4 presents data on political participation trends over the past 50
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Figure 2.4: Political participation over time
years.2 While turnout (measured using the voting age population) has indeed 
declined steadily—from over 60% in the 1952 Presidential election to less than 
50% in 2000—when turnout is measured as the percentage of voting eligible 
population that votes, the trend is less clear. The drop in the other forms of
•attend political meeting* 
•worked for party or candidate* 
•campaign donation*
•turnout (VAP)**
•turnout (VEP)**
assassinations and the civil rights movement compelling more people to get 
involved in politics. Again, this is indicative of one of the main arguments of 
this thesis—namely that individuals are more likely to participate in politics 
when the stakes are higher.
2 .2 .3  A m e r ic a n  P a r t ic ip a t io n  in  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m p a r is o n
Another way in which to get some of idea of the extent of political participation 
in the United States is to set it in comparative perspective with participation in 
other advanced industrial countries. Conventional wisdom holds that Americans 
are generally apathetic and apolitical and certainly participate in fewer numbers 
than their fellow citizens in other countries. As Figure 2.5 indicates, this is the 
case when it comes to voting. Americans’ propensity to turnout at elections 
lags far behind that of citizens in other countries. Average turnout since 1945 is 
between 12 to 28 percentage points lower in the United States than in France, 
Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden. However, when it comes to other 
forms of political participation, Americans are just as likely, sometimes more 
likely, to get involved as individuals living in these other countries, dispelling 
the myth of the disengaged American.
2 .3  In d iv id u a l  C h a r a c t e r is t ic s  o f  P a r t ic ip a n t s  a n d
N o n - P a r t ic ip a n t s
The above discussion has explored the extent of political participation in the 
contemporary United States, I now turn attention to the question of who these 
participants are and the ways in which participation is divided along socio­
demographic lines—specifically, socio-economics status (SES), race and age. 
After this exploration of the data, I present a multivariate model better get
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Figure 2.5: International comparison of political activity
at the relationships between these individual-level variables and the five mea­
sures of political activity.
2 .3 .1  S o c io - e c o n o m ic  S t a t u s  a n d  P o l it ic a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n
ions 01 political participation, in woinnger osen-
stone’s (1980) seminal analysis of voter turnout in the United States, the impact 
of increased education on the probability of voting is considerable. They find
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Figure 2.6: Education and political participation
than those with less than 5 years formal education, ceteris paribus (Wolfinger k, 
Rosenstone 1980, 24). Other studies find similarly large education effects. Blais 
(2000) estimates that moving from the least educated to the most educated 
represents an increase in the probability of voting of over 20 percentage points. 
T his relationship also holds for forms o f political participation  othrr thnn rafa
>. senators or rep- ■snouid oe percentage pomtsjmore likely to nave written to u.l
(1994, 74). As Figure 2.6 indicates, the Benchmark survey confirms the posi­
tive effects of education on political participation—we see a positive and more 
or less linear relationship between education and all five indicators of political 
participation.
Incom e . While education is the most important component of SES when it 
comes to political participation, income also plays an important role. The pos­
itive relationship between higher levels of income and increased political par­
ticipation is illustrated in the bivariate relationship displayed in Figure 2.7. 
Engagement in all forms of political participation is higher among those who 
earn more. While the relationship appears to be strongest when it comes to the 
most prevalent forms of political action—voting and signing petitions—when 
we look at the relative difference between the lowest and highest earners, we 
see that income in fact has a stronger effect on attending political meetings, 
participating in demonstrations & boycotts and being involved with a political 
group. This is consistent with the idea that participation requires resources 
(Verba, Schlozman Sz Brady 1995). The three latter forms of participation are 
more costly in terms of the time and money required to engage in them. This 
theme of resources is one that I will return to in more depth when I estimate a 
multivariate model in section 3 of this chapter.
2 .3 .2  R a c e
Race is one of the most salient features of contemporary American society. No 
study of political participation in that country can avoid examining differences 
in political activity between racial groups. Figure 2.8 presents a breakdown of 
the percent of respondents to the Benchmark survey that reported activity in the 
various political acts, by race. While bivariate relationships such as these ought 
to be taken with caution, it is nevertheless possible to discern some interesting
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Figure 2.7: Income and political participation
patterns that set the stage for the more detailed examination of the impact 
of race and racial diversity on political participation in the following chapter. 
The largest difference between racial groups is when it comes to voting—over 
80% of white citizens reported having voted in the 1996 Presidential election 
compared to between 52-56% of Asians, Hispanics and Native Americans. A 
considerably greater number of Non-Hispanic African Americans voted than 
these other minority groups, although they did not turn out in as great numbers 
as whites.
Differences in rates of activity between the racial categories decrease for
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Figure 2.8: Race and political participation
nonelectoral forms of participation and are smallest when it comes to political 
meetings, demonstrations and being active in a political group. Voting, partic­
ularly in a two-party system such as the United States, is to some extent a vote 
of confidence for the political system. If one feels alienated from that system 
or feels that one’s voice will not be heard, there is less incentive to vote. How­
ever, voting is not the only way in which to express political preferences. The 
political acts where racial differences are smallest are also those that are less 
related to the traditional political system, perhaps making them more appealing 
to individuals or groups who perceive themselves to be less powerful within tra­
ditional politics. These types of activities also tend to be characterized by more
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conflict. In Chapter 3 I deal specifically with the effect of community racial 
diversity on political participation and argue that diversity will have a larger 
effect on political participation that is more conflictual in nature and also that 
individuals of different races react differently to diversity. That is, diversity has 
varying impacts on different racial groups’ political participation.
2 .3 .3  A g e
Figure 2.9 shows that the relationship between age and all the forms of polit­
ical participation is curvilinear.3 While participation increases with age up to 
about fifty years, after this activity in all of the indicators levels off or declines. 
The leveling off trend is most evident in voting, with the probability of voting 
rising sharply for people through their twenties to fifties. Once people reach 
their sixties, the probability of voting remains relatively high and stable. There 
is some debate in the literature over whether the age-turnout relationship is 
best characterized as a generational effect or a cohort effect (see for example 
Blais 2002). Signing petitions is another form of participation that seems to be
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Figure 2.9: Age and political participation
3T he lines in Figure 2.9 are predicted probabilities plotted against respondents’ age. The 
probabilities were obtained from logistic regressions w ith age as the only independent variable.
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affected by age. In this case, activity increases modestly between ages twenty 
and midlife, after which it declines quickly. This is likely a function of younger 
people being exposed to more petitions as well as mobilization efforts for this 
type of participation being more prevalent among youth. The relationship be­
tween age and three of the other forms of political action—signing petitions, 
attending meetings or rallies and being active in a political group—are similar 
to that of voting, with engagement increasing with age. However, in the case 
of these indicators, the curvilinear relationship is more acute. When it comes 
to demonstrating and participating in boycotts, engagement declines with age 
perhaps reflecting a disengagement or distrust of traditional politics on the part 
of youth.
2 .4  A c r o s s - C i t y  V a r i a t i o n  in  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i c i p a t i o n
As I discuss in Chapter 1, the data I use here are nested, or clustered, in nature. I 
have data on individuals from the Benchmark survey and these individuals are 
clustered in cities, on which I also have data; as such observations have not 
been sampled independently of each other. As Snijders & Bosker (1999) note, 
dependence can be seen as both a nuisance and as an interesting phenomenon 
in itself (1999, 6-9). The nuisance is that dependence of observations needs to 
be corrected for in some way in order to avoid drawing incorrect inferences; for 
example, standard errors will tend to appear smaller than they actually are if 
dependence is ignored. However, I am also interested in analyzing the effects 
of different city characteristics on individual behavior. That is, I want to draw 
inferences on cities as well as individuals, making the clustering of observations 
of interest. In this thesis, the question is whether living in a community with 
certain social and political characteristics—such as varying degrees of ethnic 
heterogeneity, local governments that differ in their structure and functions
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and different levels of social capital—affects an individual’s propensity to take 
political action.
Past work using data with this kind of multilevel structure have often em­
ployed either “dummy variable models” or “interactive models” (Steenbergen 
& Jones 2002, 220). Dummy variable models, by assigning dummy variables 
for each higher-level unit (i.e. in this case cities), are able to overcome the sta­
tistical problems associated with dependence of observations in clustered data 
(Rahn & Rudolph 2001). However, one is often interested in how various as­
pects of different higher-level units impact on lower-level units; say how different 
city characteristics influence individuals’ chances of participating in politics. A 
dummy variable model is inadequate in this respect. As Steenbergen notes, 
“Dummy variables are only indicators of subgroup differences; they do not ex­
plain why the regression regimes for the subgroups are different” (Steenbergen 
h  Jones 2002, 220). Past contextual analyzes on political behavior (Huckfeldt 
1979, Huckfeldt 1984, Abowitz 1990, Oliver 1999, Oliver 2000, Oliver 2001) have 
tended to use interactive models where contextual-level independent variables 
are included alone or in interactions with individual-level variables in order to 
account for contextual heterogeneity (Rahn & Rudolph 2001). These types of 
models are not ideal either. As Humphries argues, this approach to model­
ing multilevel data “implicitly assumes a deterministic relationship between the 
contextual variable and individual-level parameters” (Humphries 2001, 684).
A more appropriate model for clustered data of the kind I have and where 
one is interested in explaining different sources of contextual heterogeneity is a 
hierarchical, or multilevel, model. Such a model provides robust standard errors 
(Raudenbush & Bryk 2002) and, as Rahn and Rudolph note:
The hierarchical model allows one to model level-1 dependent vari­
able as a function of level-1 explanatory variables, a level-1 distur­
bance term, level-2 explanatory variables, and, critically, level-2 dis­
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turbance terms. Consequently, I are able to model potential sources 
of contextual heterogeneity without imposing the questionable as­
sumption that we capture all possible sources of such heterogeneity.
By actually estimating level-2 variance components, the hierarchical 
model overcomes the problems of non-constant variance and cluster­
ing (2001, 32).
The hierarchical model begins with a level-1 structural model.4 This model can 
be expressed as follows:
Uij =  00j d" T €ij (2-1)
Where yij is the individual-level dependent variable for an individual i 
(=l j . .. tNj)  nested in level-2 unit (in this case city) j  (=1,...,«/). The term 
Xuj is the individual-level variable and is the individual-level disturbance 
term. The model is in all respects the same as the traditional regression model 
except for the important difference that the parameters are not fixed. That 
is, they vary across level-2 units as indicated by the jf-subscripts on the /3qj 
and pij parameters. This addition is crucial and makes possible the testing of 
certain hypotheses that would be difficult or impossible otherwise. At level-2 
(the city-level), I model the individual-level regression parameters as functions 
of city-level predictors:
Poj =  7oo +  Toi^i? +  j (2.2)
and
0i j — 7 io +  h i  Zj +  £ij- (2-3)
Equations 2.2 and 2.3 together make up the level-2 model where the 7- 
parameters are the fixed level-2 parameters and the ^-parameters are distur­
bance terms. Specifying these level-2 disturbances means one is are able to
4The development and notation of the multilevel model presented here draws heavily 
from the excellent discussions in Raudenbush & Bryk (2002, 16-30) and Steenbergen & Jones 
(2002, 221-3).
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avoid the unreasonable assumption one is forced to make with simple regression 
models, namely that the city-level parameters perfectly account for the varia­
tion in individual-level parameters. The full model is achieved by substituting 
the expressions for f o j  and (3 \j in (2.2) and (2.3) into (2.1):
Vij — 700 +  TOl^j +  $0j +  (7 l0  +  J l l z j  +  $ l j ) x ij  +  eij
— TOO +  T01 z j  -I- TlO^ij +  T i l z j x i j  +  $0j  +  &ljX ij  +  ei j i  (2 -4 )
where 700 is the intercept, 701 denotes the effect of the level-2 (city) variable,
710 is the effect of the individual-level predictor and 711 is the effect of the 
cross-level interaction between the individual-level and city-level predictors with 
disturbance terms represented by 8oj ,  8 \ j  and e»j.
The models presented here were estimated using the multilevel software 
HLM, version 6.02 developed by Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong & Congdon 
which produces “empirical Bayes estimates of the randomly-varying level-1 
(individual-level) parameters, generalized least squares estimates of the level- 
2 (city-level) coefficients; and maximum likelihood estimates of the variance- 
covariance components” (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong Sz Congdon 2002, 4).5 
Because all of the dependent variables are dichotomous, I estimate what Rau­
denbush Sz Bryk call hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs) (2002, 
292). Specifically, the models presented are HGLMs with a Bernoulli sampling 
model and a logit link function.
2 .4 .1  T h e  E m p t y  M o d e l
Before estimating the individual-level model, it is appropriate to begin by ask­
ing whether there in fact exists significant variation in the dependent variable 
across the contextual units—cities—and, if so, what proportion of the total 
variance is accounted for by the city-level. To gauge the magnitude of variation
5See Raudenbush & Bryk (2002) for details on estimating the various coefficients.
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between cities in political participation it is useful to begin by estimating an 
unconditional, or so-called empty model; that is, a model with no predictors at 
either level. This produces estimates for the grand mean as well as providing 
information on the variance at the individual and city-levels (Raudenbush & 
Bryk 2002, 24). The individual-level model is thus simply
political participation^  = f o j  +  (2.5)
and the city-level model is
foj = 7oo +  do* j ~  N(0,  Too). (2.6)
The full model, by substitution of f o j  in (2.5) into (2.6), is
political participation4 • =  700 +  Soj +  6ij. (2.7)
This model is equivalent to a one-way ANOVA with random effects. Here 700 
is the average log-odds of political participation—the population grand mean— 
while Soj is the specific effect of city j  and is the residual effect for individual i 
within this city. Snijders & Bosker (1999) explain the variance structure of this 
model and the idea of the intraclass correlation coeffiencient (ICC) as follows:6
[M] aero-unit j  has the ‘true mean’ 700 +  foj, and each measurement 
of a micro-unit within this macro-unit deviates from this true mean 
by some value, called Units differ randomly from one another,
which is reflected by the fact that §oj is a random variable Some
units have a high true mean, corresponding to a high value of foj, 
others have a close to average, still others a low true mean. It is 
assumed that all variables are independent, the group effects foj 
having population mean 0 and population variance r 2 (the popula­
tion between-group variance), and the residuals having mean 0 and 
variance a2 (the population within-group variance) (1999, 17).
6Some of the notation in the following quotations has been changed to be consistent with 
the rest of the equations in the text.
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In the case of the data analyzed here where the micro-units are individuals and 
macro-units are cities, a2 is the variance within cities about their true means 
and r 2 is the variance between cities’ true means. Snijders & Bosker go on to 
illustrate how the empty model is used to partition the variance in data with a 
multilevel structure:
Given the model (2.7) [sic], the total variance of Y  can be decom­
posed as the sum of the level-two and level-one variances,
var(Y^) =  var(60j) +  var(e^) =  r 2 +  cr2.
The covariance between two individuals (i and i', with i ^  i') in the 
same group j  is equal to the variance of the contribution Soj that is 
shared by these individuals,
cov(Yi:j, Yi’j) =  var((50j) =  t$, 
and their correlation is
P (Y i j ,Y i - j )  =  (r 2 +  a 2) •
This parameter is ... the intraclass correlation coefficient It can
be interpreted in two ways: it is the correlation between two ran­
domly drawn individuals in one randomly drawn group, and it is 
also the fraction of the total variability that is due to the group 
level (1999, 46).
This same parameter can be applied to models with explanatory variables. It 
is then referred to as the residual intraclass correlation coefficient and is inter­
preted as the fraction of the total variation due to the group level, controlling 
for X  (Snijders Sz Bosker 1999, 48). In the analyses that follow, I am often 
interested in changes in the ICC controlling for various explanatory variables. 
That is, a key aspect of these models is the impact of independent variables— 
most importantly contextual factors—on the variation in political participation 
between cities.
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Table 2.1: ANOVA®
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Demo/boycott Pol. group
Fixed Effects 
Intercept (700) 1.060* -0.358* -1.470* -2.393* -2 .102*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.052) (0.042)
Random Effects 
City-Level Variance ( t o o ) 0.334* 0.415* 0.327* 0.454* 0.303*
(0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.052) (0.029)
Intraclass correlation (p) 0.092 0.112 0.090 0.121 0.084
-2 x Log Likelihood 38384.286 41152.177 36948.140 32347.636 33108.067
°  N=12,969; J=656. * significant at .01%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
The estimated results from the empty models for the five indicators of polit­
ical participation are presented in Table 2.1. Beginning with the empty model 
for voting, the results are 700= 1.060 (se=0.035), f o o = 0 .1 1 2  (se=0.026). Thus, 
for a city with a typical voting rate, that is, for a city with a random effect 
<$Oj=0 , the expected log-odds of voting is 1.060, corresponding to an odds of 
exp(1.060)=2.886. This corresponds to a probability of 1+exp^1_1060) =  0.743. 
The probabilities of engaging in the other forms of participation in cities with 
typical participation rates axe .411 for signing petitions, .190 for attending po­
litical meetings, .084 when it comes to demonstrations and boycotts and the 
probability of being involved with a political group in a city with a typical rate 
for such participation is .109.
Table 2.1 also shows that there exists statistically significant variation at 
the city-level for all five types of political participation, making it clear that 
political participation is more fruitfully modeled as a multilevel phenomena, or 
at the very least, that the multilevel nature of political participation should not 
be ignored.7 In order to get an idea of how much of the overall variance in
7To determine whether variance components are statistically significant, I perform a 
likelihood ratio test by comparing the deviance statistics of two models (Raudenbush & 
Bryk 2002, Snijders & Bosker 1999, Steenbergen &; Jones 2002). The deviance is -2 x the 
log likelihood (Raudenbush &; Bryk 2002, 64). First, I estimate a model with an unrestricted 
variance component (i.e. a randomly varying intercept), producing a deviance D\. Next, a 
model where the variance component is restricted to zero is estimated, giving a deviance Dq.
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political participation is attributable to either the individual-level or the city- 
level, it is useful to calculate the intraclass correlation coefficient.8 Recall that 
the error terms in these models capture two levels of unexplained variation in 
the dependent variable—variation at the individual level and at the city level. 
The ICC measures the proportion of the variance of the dependent variable that 
is between cities. As Steenbergen & Jones note in their analysis of support for 
the European Union, it is unsurprising that the individual-level accounts for a 
great deal of the variance when data are measured at the individual-level, as 
they are in my study (2002, 231). Nonetheless, the proportion of the variance 
in political participation that is between cities is still considerable—for voting 
it is 9.2% (that is, 100 x .334/(.334 +  3.29)), 11.2% of the variance in signing 
petitions is accounted for at the city-level while the proportion of variance that is 
between cities for political meetings, demonstrations and boycotts and political 
group involvement is 9%, 12.1% and 8.4% respectively.
2 .4 .2  An I n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  M o d e l  o f  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n
Now I turn to the individual-level model. The model (written as in (2.4)) is as 
follows:
turnoutij = 700 +  £71 oRacei +  £ 720I NDi  +  80j +  etj . (2.8)
Here Race is a set of dummy variables for the race of individual respondents
and IND is a vector of individual-level controls (gender, education, age and
Subtracting Dq from D\ generates a statistic with a x2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom, 
allowing me to calculate a p-value for the test.
8The intraclass correlation coefficient for linear multilevel models is obtained by the fol­
lowing formula: p = rop+ g 2 where cr2 is the individual-level variance. However, in nonlin­
ear models, such as the logit models estimated here, this formula is less useful because the 
individual-level variance is heteroscedastic (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002, 298). Snijders & Bosker 
describe an alternative definition of the ICC for nonlinear models as follows: p = T00+°2/3 • 
This definition treats the dependent variable as an underlying latent continuous variable fol­
lowing a logistic distribution, the variance (i.e. the individual-level variance in my models) 
for this distribution is 7t 2/ 3  (Snijders & Bosker 1999, 223-4 ).
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age squared). All of the variables are modeled as fixed effects—that is, I do 
not allow the effects to vary across cities. I have not included any city-level 
predictors yet as I want to first estimate an individual-level model, in part to 
determine the impact of individual-level variables on political participation and 
in part to estimate how much of the variance in the dependent variables across 
communities is accounted for by individual factors alone.
The estimates from this model are presented in table 2.2. The results for the 
individual-level variables are largely consistent with existing research. Individu­
als with higher socio-economic status (SES) tend to be more likely to participate 
than others (Verba, Schlozman h  Brady 1995, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). 
Here education has a strong positive effect on all forms of political participa­
tion. The estimated effects of income are somewhat less conclusive. While the 
general trend is for higher earners to be more likely to participate, this is not 
the case for activity in demonstrations and boycotts. For this indicator, income 
seems not to have a significant impact. When it comes to voting and signing 
petitions, the effect of income is between people in the lowest income brackets 
and the highest earners. Respondents who earn in the middle brackets do not 
differ significantly from the high-earning reference group. Income has the most 
consistent positive impact on the likelihood of participating in a political group.
Age has a positive effect on an individual’s propensity to participate in all 
of the activities examined. As people get older, it is more likely that they take 
political action. The effect is strongest for voting and considerably weaker for 
nonelectoral forms of participation. The squared term of Age is also significant 
indicating that as people get very old, the positive effect of age on voting tapers 
off. Again, the result for age is consistent with previous work, most notably on 
turnout (see for example Blais 2000, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980).
The models reported in Table 2.2 point to both race and gender differences 
across different forms of political participation. Blacks are more likely than
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white respondents to report having voted in the 1996 Presidential election. The 
same holds for attending political meetings or rallies while black respondents 
are less likely to have signed a petition. The estimates for demonstrations and 
political group activity fail to meet conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Asian and Hispanic Americans, on the other hand, have lower probabilities of 
participating in any of the five acts, compared to white respondents. However, 
these estimates are significant only for voting and petition signing for Asians 
and voting, petitions and attending political meetings for Hispanics.
While some researchers do report findings to the effect that women partic­
ipate to a lesser extent than men, much recent research points to the gender 
gap closing (Conway 2000, Rosenstone & Hansen 1994). The results in Table
2.2 show that women are more likely than men to vote, controlling for the other 
variables in the models. They also have a higher probability of participating in 
politics by signing a petition. Women axe, however, significantly less likely to 
be active in a political group or to attend meetings or rallies. One explanation 
for these findings is that the latter two forms of participation are considerably 
more time consuming than either voting or signing petitions. As women are 
more likely to devote time to both work and childcare, as well as other domestic 
work, than men, it means that they have less time to spend on costly forms of 
political participation.9
Examining the bottom part of the table, it is evident that the estimates of 
the variance components of the random portion of the models—the randomly 
varying individual-level intercept, /?oj, are significant in all of the models ex­
cept voting. That is, after controlling for the individual-level factors, there still 
remains a significant amount of variation in signing petitions, attending politi­
cal meetings, participating in demonstrations and boycotts as well as activity in 
political groups across cities in the United States. Also, as the intraclass correla­
t o r  more detailed discussions of gender differences in political participation see Burns, 
Schlozman & Verba (2001) and Verba, Schlozman & Brady (1995).
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Table 2.2: Individual-level effects on participation0
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting D em o/boycott Pol. group
Fixed Effects 
Intercept 1.430*** -0.281*** -1.608*** -2.473*** -2.254***
(0.046) (0.037) (0.046) (0.076) (0.055)
Black6 0.183** -0.228*** 0.392*** -0.111 0.150
(0.085) (0.049) (0.071) (0.140) (0.101)
Asian -1.38*** -0.698*** -0.202 -0.447 -0.321
(0.114) (0.115) (0.147) (0.243) (0.197)
Hispanic -0.526*** -0.333*** -0.221*** -0.113 -0.048
(0.080) (0.073) (0.082) (0.137) (0.115)
Age 0.124*** 0.048*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.019*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Under $20KC -0.647*** -0.385*** -0.400*** -0.055 -0.574***
(0.073) (0.081) (0.079) (0.117) (0.118)
$20-29,000 -0.479*** -0.233*** -0.247*** 0.174 -0.449***
(0.088) (0.069) (0.082) (0.114) (0.100)
$30-49,999 -0.181** -0.098* -0.281*** 0.120 -0.241**
(0.075) (0.059) (0.060) (0.083) (0.096)
$50-74,999 -0.042 -0.036 -0.229*** 0.189* -0.283**
(0.074) (0.054) (0.074) (0.109) (0.108)
$75-99,999 -0.074 -0.104* -0.132* 0.068 -0.204**
(0.092) (0.059) (0.079) (0.104) (0.097)
High school*1 -2.511*** -1.294*** -1.350*** -1.090*** -1.662***
(0.116) (0.099) (0.135) (0.271) (0.259)
Some college -1.563*** -0.810*** -1.098*** -0.676*** -1.256***
(0.082) (0.062) (0.077) (0.098) (0.103)
Bachelors -0.812*** -0.258*** -0.392*** -0.310*** -0.498***
(0.068) (0.046) (0.067) (0.079) (0.071)
Female 0.148*** 0.121*** -0.155*** 0.026 -0.310***
(0.052) (0.033) (0.047) (0.070) (0.053)
Random Effects 
City-level Variance ( t o o ) 0.232 0.387*** 0.301*** 0.416*** 0.259***
Intraclass correlation (p ) 0.067 0.105 0.084 0.112 0.073
-2 x Log Likelihood 35202.440 40290.022 36454.903 32051.171 32663.059
° N=12,696; J=656. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
 ^Reference group for race is “white” .
c Reference group for income is “over $100K”.
 ^Reference group for education is “Graduate school” .
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tion coefficients indicate, of the unexplained variance in the dependent variables 
remaining after controlling for other factors in the models, a substantive por­
tion is still at the city level. The variance component for the voting model 
falls just short of conventional levels of statistical significance. One caveat that 
deserves mention is that the voting variable measures voting in a Presidential 
election. As such, perhaps one should not expect variation across cities, since 
cities are not the most politically relevant geography for this type of political 
participation.
2 .5  C o n c l u s i o n
In this chapter I have sketched a map of the participatory territory, outlining 
the extent of engagement among the different types of political participation, 
put participation in the contemporary United States in comparative perspective 
and explored the socio-demographics of participation. While the individual-level 
models discussed so far do a fairly good job of explaining political participation, 
there nevertheless remains a significant amount of variation in the dependent 
variables across communities even after controlling for individual-level socio­
demographics. That is, similar people do not participate to the same extent in 
different communities. The remaining chapters of the thesis explore explana­
tions for this inter-community variation. In the next chapter the impact of racial 
diversity on political participation is discussed; Chapter 4 looks at how political 
participation is influenced by the structure and functions of local government; 
and Chapter 5 examines the role of social capital in affecting the propensity of 
individuals to take political action.
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Chapter 3
Com m unity H eterogeneity and 
Political Participation
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3 .1  T h e  I m p a c t  o f  D i v e r s i t y  o n  P o l i t i c a l
P a r t ic ip a t io n
While issues of race and their influence on political behavior and attitudes have 
long been studied by scholars of American politics, the focus of most of this 
research has been on how the race of individuals affects various outcomes. Until 
recently it has been rare that race as a characteristic of community context or 
environment has been taken into account (Oliver 2001). Perhaps in response 
to the realization that diversity is increasing and patters of racial integration 
changing, there have been a number of new studies on the impact of racial het­
erogeneity (eg. Alesina Sz La Ferrera 2000, Costa Sz Kahn 2003, Oliver 2001). 
The majority of studies examining heterogeneity and participation argue that 
increased heterogeneity is detrimental to levels of engagement.1 The social cap­
ital literature from Putnam forward argues that diversity may be a hindrance 
to social capital and more specifically to civic engagement. Ethnically diverse 
places tend to have lower levels of social trust—that is, trust in people in gen­
eral, even those one does not know (Saguaro Seminar 2001). But what is the 
relationship between diversity and civic engagement? A number of authors 
make the claim that civic engagement is higher (or ought to be higher) in ar­
eas characterized by homogeneity (Alesina &; La Ferrera 2000, Alesina Sz La 
Ferrera 2002, Mutz 2002, Costa Sz Kahn 2003). The reasoning being that indi­
viduals in these areas are a) more able to overcome collective action problems 
associated with participation and b) more willing to volunteer and engage in a 
community whose other citizens share their values and beliefs.
This argument has mostly been applied to non-political civic engagement 
but has even been used by scholars of political participation—which is what is
1Notable exceptions are Oliver (2001) who argues that increasing racial segregation be­
tween suburbs is related to decreased political and civic engagement and Campbell (2002) 
who argues that the relationship between diversity and political participation is curvilinear 
so that political activity is lower at both extremes of diversity and homogeneity.
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of central concern here. Diana Mutz, for example argues that people exposed 
to “cross-pressures” in networks characterized by political disagreement (ideo­
logical heterogeneity) are less likely to participate than those who exist in more 
homogenous surroundings where they agree with those around them. The rea­
soning is that people in the former will be ambivalent in their political views 
because of the conflicting pressures put on them by others in their network, 
thus making it less likely that they will take action (Mutz 2002, 840). Alesina 
& La Ferrera (2000) also argue that people in areas in which racial heterogeneity 
and income inequality are high are less likely to participate as a consequence of 
group formation being more difficult in such areas.
There are however, a number of difficulties with these arguments. Alesina 
and La Ferrara lump together very disparate forms of participation in their 
study. A clear distinction needs to be made between political participation and 
participation in non-political groups. The motivations for engaging in these will 
be very different. It may be that civic, that is non-political, engagement is higher 
in more homogenous areas for the reasons Alesina and La Ferrara cite. However, 
as we see below, these same reasons may well be good arguments as to why we 
could expect political participation to be lower in such areas. While the social 
capital literature argues that increased diversity leads to decreased generalized 
trust and, therefore, less political participation, a strong case can be made that 
the diminished trust in diverse communities should mean more participation. 
If one is distrustful of others in one’s community, it makes sense to ensure that 
one’s own voice is heard through taking part in politics. Another shortcoming 
of much of the extant literature is that it assumes (or derives) similar effects 
for different groups in society. That is, the effect of racial environment on 
political behavior is assumed to be the same for people of different racial or 
ethnic backgrounds. In this chapter I challenge that assumption. It may well 
be that race does not have the same effect across all communities and that racial
58
diversity affects racial groups differently.
In contrast to much of the literature, an argument can be made that commu­
nity heterogeneity—racial heterogeneity in particular—should lead to a higher 
likelihood of people participating in politics. One potential reason for this is 
that cities or communities characterized by heterogeneity will tend to have more 
conflicts over resources and policies and more mobilized groups leading to more 
political participation. Recent work in group conflict theory shows that racial 
attitudes and policy preferences are strongly influenced by group identities and 
the perception that what other groups gain, the own group loses. As Glaser 
puts it, “In essence, this theory posits that individuals have a zero-sum view 
of politics, that they think in group terms, in ‘us’ and ‘them’ terms, and that 
they see the possibility that their own group could lose something valued to a 
rival group” (Glaser 1994, 23). In other words, individuals view politics, at least 
in part, as a competitive struggle between groups for scarce resources and are 
motivated to attempt “to affect the process and pattern of their distribution” 
(Bobo 1988, 95).
Not only is the individual-level race important for the development of these 
attitudes and related behaviors, but the racial environment is crucial. People 
living in more racially diverse areas will be inclined to express these kinds of 
attitudes more than those in less heterogeneous areas (Glaser 2003). Race and 
racial identity become more salient in more racially heterogeneous places. In the 
following sections I test the impact of racial diversity on political participation. 
I begin with a slightly modified version of the individual-level model presented 
in Chapter 2. In the individual-level model here, I specify race as a random 
variable in order to be able to examine whether the effect of race on people’s 
propensity for participation is different in across cities. I then go on to look 
at the ways in which the effect of individuals’ race interacts with the racial 
environment.
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Table 3.1: Individual-level effects on voting0
Variable: Estimate Odds-ratio
Constant 1.257
(0.039)***
3.517
Black 0.099
(0.070)
1.104
Asian -1.766
(0.128)***
0.171
Hispanic -1.055
(0.066)***
0.348
Female 0.169
(0.051)***
1.182
Education 0.803
(0.032)***
2.233
Age 0.122
(0.007)***
1.130
Age2 -0.001
(0 .000)***
0.999
Random effects:
Intercept (too) 0.300***
Black (T02) 0.353***
Asian (r03) 0.715***
Hispanic (T04) 0.246*
°N=14,153; J=690. Dependent variable is “voted in 
1996”; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a 
logistic model estimated using restricted 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Excluded category for race 
is “white”.
3.1.1 T h e  V a r y in g  E f f e c t  o f  R a c e  o n  P a r t ic ip a t io n
The first model estimated here is similar to the one in the previous chapter; it 
differs in that Race is a random variable here. The model is:
t u r n o u t i j  =  700 + £710- f t  ace*j +  £720INDi  +  S0j  + £<hj R a c e i j  + e^-. (3.1)
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Here Race is again a set of dummy variables for the race of individual respon­
dents and IND a vector of individual-level controls. The estimates from this 
model are presented in table 3.1. Turning to the bottom part of the table, the 
variance components for the intercept as well as the randomly varying dummy 
variables for race are significant. That is, the effect of race on political partici­
pation is not constant across communities in the United States. The next step 
is to specify a model that tries to predict those varying slopes.
3 .1 .2  T h e  R a c ia l  D i v e r s i t y  M o d e l
Now I turn to the model testing the effects of racial diversity on political partic­
ipation. Community heterogeneity is operationalized using a measure of racial 
fractionalization for each city in the sample. Following Easterly & Levine (1997), 
Alesina, Baqir h  Easterly (1999), Alesina & La Ferrera (2000) and others, racial 
fictionalization is measured by a Herfindahl-based index constructed from the 
US Census, defined as follows:
racial fractionalization = Ski
k
where i represents a given city and k the following races: (i) White; (ii) Black; 
(iii) American Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian; (iv) Asian, Pacific Islander; (v) His­
panic. Each term Ski is the share of race k in the population of city i. The 
index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in area i 
belong to different races and takes on values between 0 and 1. Higher values of 
the index represent more racial heterogeneity.
As I mentioned in the previous section, I am interested in relaxing the as­
sumptions that race has the same affect across all communities and that racial 
diversity has the same impact on all racial groups. The random race coefficients 
in (3.1) test the first of these and the crosslevel interaction terms in (3.3) below,
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test the second. However, there is a model between these two which specifies a 
main effect for racial diversity. Before turning to predicting the random slopes 
in (3.1), I want to investigate the overall effect of racial diversity on political 
participation. This model is:
turnoutij =700  +  loiRFj +  E710Raceij +  E720IN D t +  80j +  E^-R ace^ +  .
(3.2)
The results from this model are presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Racial diversity and voting®
Variable: Estimate Odds-ratio
Constant 1 .3 8 5
( 0 .0 3 9 ) * * *
3 .9 9 6
Black - 0 .0 1 7
( 0 .0 7 9 )
0 .9 8 3
Asian - 1 .4 6 3
( 0 .1 1 3 ) * * *
0 .2 3 2
Hispanic - 1 .0 9 4
( 0 .0 6 5 ) * * *
0 .3 3 5
Female 0 . 2 0 2
( 0 .0 4 9 ) * * *
1 .2 2 4
Education 0 .3 9 9
( 0 .0 1 9 ) * * *
1 .4 9 1
Age 0 .0 9 8
( 0 .0 0 7 ) * * *
1 .1 0 3
Age2
Contextual effects:
- 0 . 0 0 1
(0 .0 0 0 ) * * *
0 .9 9 9
Racial fractionalization 
Random effects:
- 0 .3 7 5
( 0 .1 8 5 ) * *
0 .6 8 7
Intercept ( t o o ) 0 .2 9 2 * * *
Black (T0 2 ) 0 .4 1 7 * * *
Asian (T0 3 ) 0 .5 9 7 * * *
Hispanic (T0 4 ) 0 .2 7 3 *
0  N=14,153; J=690. Dependent variable is “voted in 
1996”; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model 
estimated using restricted maximum likelihood in 
HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Excluded category for race is “white”.
The main effect of racial diversity on political participation is negative and
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significant. That is, the likelihood of voting is lower in cities that are more 
diverse. However, as mentioned above, this ignores the possibility that there 
are different effects of racial environment for different groups. Furthermore, 
racial diversity, or heterogeneity, also means different things for different racial 
groups. A feature of American cities is that the size of the white population 
is negatively related to racial diversity while the size of the black population 
is positively related to diversity. So, as diversity goes up, the white in-group 
decreases and minority in-group size tends to increase. This relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The negative main effect of racial diversity may be a
0.01 0.20 0.38 0.57 0.76
0.01 0.20 0.38 0.57 0.76
Racial fractionalization
Figure 3.1: Racial fractionalization by size of racial group in American cities
result of the fact that the white population is greater in most cities than that of 
the black population or other minority populations. Therefore, it is interesting 
to investigate whether the relationship found in the main effect holds for the
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interaction between diversity and race.
While the previous model estimated the slopes for each racial category by 
specifying these individual-level terms as random, in the full model I attempt 
to predict those slopes with my measure of racial heterogeneity. That is, I 
include cross-level interaction terms between the individual-level race dummies 
and racial fractionalization. In other words, in (3.1) I am testing the hypothesis 
that differences in voting between groups are not constant across cities; now I 
want to predict this variation using the level of racial heterogeneity in each city. 
The full model is as follows:
t u r n o u t i j  =  700 +  7 oi R F j  +  E710 I N D i  +  E720 R a c e ^
T S 721 FFj * RciCCij T 6oj T 2^2jRacCij -I- €ij . (3.3)
Of interest here are the estimates for the effects of racial fractionalization on 
the random slopes of the four race categories included at the individual-level; 
the cross-level interactions. The other individual-level estimates remain largely 
unchanged in this model. Turning to the variables of interest, it is instruc­
tive to first examine the estimates of the variance components for the random 
effects. All the variance components have decreased from the previous model 
with the addition of the city-level factor of racial fractionalization, though only 
modestly, suggesting that the new variable is doing some work in reducing the 
unexplained variance across cities. The variance components remain significant, 
however, indicating that the city-level variables in the model do not explain all
the variance across communities.2
2While the tables contain the variance components, it also instructive to consider their 
co-variances. In the model presented in Table 3, the intercept is positively correlated with 
Asian, but negatively with black and Hispanic indicating that if white participation is high, 
the difference between white and Asian tends to be relatively small, but that between white 
and black or Hispanic relatively large. Note that in such a case black participation may still 
be relatively (compared to other cities) high, but the difference between blacks and whites 
is larger than usual. The correlations between the race effects tell a similar story. They are 
positive between black and Hispanic but negative between Asian and black or Hispanic. This 
implies that in a city where the difference between white and black is large, it also tends to 
be large between white and Hispanic but relatively small between white and Asian.
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Table 3.3: The interaction between racial diversity and race on 
voting0
Variable: Estimate Odds-ratio
Constant 1.251
(0.033)***
3.495
Black -0.270
(0.091)***
0.764
Asian -2.154
(0.158)***
0.116
Hispanic -1.407
(0.090)***
0.245
Female 0.232
(0.046)***
1.262
Education 0.672
(0.028)***
1.960
Age 0.123
(0.007)***
1.130
Age2 -0.001
(0 .000)***
0.999
Contextual effects:
Racial fractionalization x white -0.289
(0.174)*
0.749
Racial fractionalization x black 0.961
(0.458)**
2.613
Racial fractionalization x Asian 0.814
(0.751)
2.257
Racial fractionalization x Hispanic -1.407
(0.402)
0.245
Random effects:
Intercept (too) 0.290***
Black (r02) 0.348***
Asian (r03) 0.696***
Hispanic (704) 0.244*
a N=14,153; J=690. Dependent variable is “voted in 1996”; * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a 
logistic model estimated using restricted maximum likelihood in HLM; 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Excluded category for race is 
“white”.
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Racial fractionalization
Figure 3.2: The Effect of racial diversity on the probability of voting among 
racial groups
The cross-level interactions for whites and blacks are both significant and 
suggest that racial heterogeneity affects these racial groups differently.The ef­
fect of racial fractionalization on voting for whites is significant and negative. 
Increasing racial diversity, according to this model, decreases the likelihood of 
voting for white people. The Racial fractionalization*. black interaction, on other 
hand, has a positive sign and is statistically significant. That is, racial diversity 
positively predicts voting among blacks—as diversity increases, so do the odds 
of voting for a black person. While the estimates from the main effects for Asian 
and Hispanic are significant, the interaction terms for these with racial fraction­
alization fail to meet conventional levels of statistical significance. Figure 3.2 
illustrates graphically the effect of letting racial diversity predict the probability 
of voting for blacks and whites.3 If you are black, your odds of voting increase
3T he predicted effects are obtained by holding all independent variables at their mean 
and allowing the racial fractionalization index to vary over its full range found in the data.
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with increasing levels of racial diversity. The effect on blacks of racial diversity 
strong enough to make blacks more likely to turn out than whites as one moves 
up the racial fractionalization scale. A black person moving from a very ho­
mogenous community with a score at the bottom of the racial fractionalization 
index to a city at the high end of the diversity scale would represent a jump in 
the probability of voting from .737 to .872, holding all other factors constant. 
For a white person, the same move entails a drop in the probability of voting 
from .775 to .738. As Figure 3.2 demonstrates, the impact of racial diversity is 
considerably stronger for blacks than for whites.
3 .2  C o n c l u s i o n
Much previous research on the effects of racial diversity on civic engagement, 
social capital and political participation maintains that increased levels of di­
versity will serve to decrease political activity. In this chapter I have argued the 
opposite; that people living in more diverse communities will be more likely to 
participate in politics. Inter-racial attitudes tend to be more conflictual in more 
diverse places where race and racial identity are more salient. That is, individu­
als see race relations in terms of a zero-sum competition over resources and their 
distribution. More racially diverse places should as a result be characterized by 
more conflict, more issues and therefore more political participation. I also hy­
pothesized that the differences in voting between racial groups will vary between 
cities and this variability can, in part, be explained by racial heterogeneity.
The analysis shows that the effect of racial diversity on whites’ likelihood of 
voting is negative. That is, living in a more racially diverse place tends to sup­
press turnout among whites. However, when racial fractionalization was used 
to predict the slope of each individual racial group, this relationship reversed
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for non-Hispanic blacks. For black people, living in a more diverse commu­
nity raises the probability of voting. The results from this analysis indicate 
that the relationship between racial diversity and political participation is not 
straightforward and that it impacts differently on people from distinct racial 
groups. Specifying a model where the individual effect of race is allowed to 
vary randomly across cities uncovers different results which remain “hidden” in 
models where race effects are fixed. In this model, racial heterogeneity becomes 
a strong predictor of participation for members of minority groups while the 
participation of whites remains negatively related to diversity. One needs to 
explicitly model the effect of diversity on separate racial groups in order to get 
at these associations.
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Chapter 4
Local Government Institutions
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4 .1  In t r o d u c t i o n
The organization of local government in the United States is complex with 
county, city and special purpose governments as well as elected school boards all 
providing services and levying taxes. Moreover, as Ostrom, Bish & Ostrom note, 
these governments are essentially organized according to fifty different sets of 
rules since the laws governing local governments are under the jurisdiction of the 
states’ constitutions and legislatures (1988, 1). Not only is there great variation 
between these different types of governments, there are also vast differences 
within the categories, particularly among cities—the focus of this thesis. Some 
cities, like Chicago, are famously run by mayors with vast powers who control 
political appointments, budgets, council agendas and city contracts. Others, for 
example Phoenix, Arizona—a city of over 1.3 million—also have mayors, but in 
Phoenix the mayor is largely indistinguishable from other council members and 
lacks the powers of his Chicagoan colleague (see also Oliver 2001, 175). In cities 
such as Phoenix real power lies with professional city managers (Ostrom, Bish 
h  Ostrom 1988, 44-5). In Seattle, for example, city representatives are elected 
at-large and ballots are nonpartisan, while in Tucson, a similarly sized city, 
council members are elected from single-member districts in partisan elections. 
Cities also differ in the size of their councils, how much and in what areas they 
tax their residents, the services they provide as well as the extent to which they 
have mechanisms for direct democracy. In this chapter, I examine the effects of 
this institutional variation on political participation.
There is a large literature linking political behavior—in particular voter 
turnout—to institutional structure at the national level. Gosnell (1930), in his 
early seminal work, illustrated how turnout in European countries varied along 
with differences in electoral systems. More recently, Jackman (1987) and Powell 
(1986) and later Jackman h  Miller (1995, 2004) and Franklin (2004) have showed 
how differences in turnout are to a large degree a function of differences in
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political institutions. These institutions include the number of political parties, 
laws making voting compulsory, the level of political competition and electoral 
disproportionality (Jackman Sz Miller 2004, 138).
Many of differences in how local governments are run and organized have 
their roots in the Progressive Era reforms that came into effect in parts of 
the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These reforms 
had the goal of stopping corruption in city politics and limiting the power of 
political machines. While these efforts were clearly meant to strengthen local 
democracy, they may have had the unintended consequence of lowering rates 
of political participation. The way in which local governments are organized 
structures incentives and opportunities for political participation.
4 .2  T h e  O r g a n i z a t io n  o f  A m e r ic a n  L o c a l
G o v e r n m e n t
The earliest local governments in the United States were organized around 
principles of individual self-government. These ideas were reflected in Toc- 
queville’s observations on 18th century New England townships (Ostrom, Bish 
Sz Ostrom 1988, Tocqueville 1969 [1832]). The main idea was one of decen­
tralization. Townships exercised power over their own concerns and citizens 
of towns were directly involved in the process of governing their communities. 
Government was practised by assemblies of all citizens as well as by elected 
bodies (Ostrom, Bish Sz Ostrom 1988, 22). This form of township govern­
ment was effective as long as populations were small. However, as the country 
changed from a mostly rural society to one of larger urban concentrations, lo­
cal governments based on citizen assemblies and direct democracy gave way to 
representative governments (Oliver 2001, 175-6). This shift gave rise to local
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political parties and a system machine politics that characterized local gov­
ernment up to the early decades of the 20th century. The massive increase 
in immigration occurring at the time when representative government struc­
tures were emerging, served to strengthen the development of machine politics. 
As Oliver puts it, immigrants came to be “organized into powerful political 
constituencies guided by patronage politics” (2001, 176). The ward system 
of electing city representatives—whereby representatives where selected from 
single-member districts within the city—meant that local politicians could ef­
fectively distribute benefits to groups whose loyalty was needed to ensure polit­
ical success. The basis of the political machine—which existed to deliver votes 
“with mechanical regularity”—was not ideology or political issues but rather 
patronage (Stone 1996, 446). Ostrom, Bish &; Ostrom (1988, 28-9) argue that 
political machines had incentives to:
. . .  slate candidates for all the numerous legislative, executive, and 
judicial offices in its relevant political jurisdictions; to procure posi­
tions on public payrolls for those assisting in its organizational efforts 
to conduct campaigns, canvass votes, and deliver voters to the polls; 
to control the decisions made by the public officials elected as a part 
of the organization’s slate; and to receive contributions from those 
who benefit from the decisions taken.
The corruption and rising costs associated with this type of politics led to efforts 
at reforming the institutions of local government. Several broad categories of 
reforms took place: the structure of local government executives; electoral re­
form; as well as reforms to the local civil service (Ostrom, Bish & Ostrom 1988, 
Ch 3).
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II
4 .2 .1  E x e c u t i v e  R e f o r m s
In order to curb the power of political bosses, some cities adopted reforms to 
strengthen the powers of the mayor. The so-called Weak-Mayor Plan, in place 
in many American cities prior to the Progressive Era, was characterized by 
a plethora of elected officials who were more or less accountable only to their 
constituents as opposed to a central executive. This setup created opportunities 
for political bosses to control local politics (Ostrom, Bish Sz Ostrom 1988, 41). 
The Strong-Mayor Plan—also called the Mayor-council form—was a response 
to this shortcoming, the idea being that a strong mayor would have incentives 
to speak for the entire community and the opportunities for political machines 
to distribute pork in exchange for votes would be limited. The Commission 
Plan of local government was another governance structure adopted to make 
the running of cities more efficient. Under this plan, elected commissioners 
each have responsibility for administering separate departments. In this way, 
one body deals with both administrative and legislative tasks. Efficiency was 
the prime benefit of this form of government, but early proponents also argued 
that cities run by Commissions were, if not immune, certainly less prone to 
corruption and machine politics (Ryan 1911, 48-50).
Making mayors stronger was one approach to combating boss rule; elimi­
nating mayors altogether—or eliminating them in all but name—was another 
strategy. Aside from Mayor-council governments, the Council-manager form of 
government is most prevalent in the United States. As Ostrom, Bish Sz Ostrom 
(1988, 48) put it, the Council-manager form of local government is analogous 
to a private corporation “in which stockholders elect a board of directors that 
in turn selects an executive officer to assume responsibility for the management 
of the firm.” This governance structure is such that a small council is elected 
by citizens and this council in turn appoints a professional city manager who 
has responsibility for the overall operation of city affairs.
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4.2.2 E l e c t o r a l  R e f o r m s
Reforms to the way in which the executives of local governments are structured 
were also accompanied by several electoral reforms including:
• open primaries replacing party caucuses
• nonpartisan elections
• at large electoral districts instead of wards
• measures for direct democracy such as initiatives and referenda
• recall elections (Hawley 1973, Ostrom, Bish & Ostrom 1988).
The first two of these institutional changes were aimed at reducing the role of 
parties in elections. When citizens do not have engage in the party caucus in 
order to run in an election, but instead can simply put their names forward 
as candidates in a primary, party control of the process is limited. Prohibiting 
political party labels through nonpartisan elections further diminishes the ability 
to political machines to mobilize a broad slate of candidates. The argument for 
local representatives elected at large, in city-wide elections, is that these will be 
more likely to take account of the concerns of the entire community. Much of 
the patronage and corruption associated with pre-reform governments stemmed 
from the fact that local representatives came from single-member wards and 
where therefore able to funnel appointments, contracts and other benefits to 
their constituents (Stone 1996). Finally, the reform movement brought with it 
measures for direct democracy. In many American cities it became possible for 
citizens to directly propose and vote on ordinances and changes to city charters. 
Provisions for recall elections were also instituted in a great number of cities. 
This institution makes it possible for elected officials to be removed from office 
before their term is up in a special election triggered by a citizen initiated 
petition (Magleby 1984, Magleby 1988).
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Table 4.1: Forms of Government by Population Size®
Population size
Under
10,000
10,GOO- 
25,000
25,000-
<50,000
50,000-
<100,000
100,000-
250,000
Over
250,000
Form of govt.
Mayor-council 79% 54% 42% 38% 43% 62%
Council-manager 12% 40% 56% 59% 54% 35%
Commission 2% 4% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Town meeting 3% 1% — — — —
Other 4% 1% — 1% — —
Electoral districts
At large 85% 69% 65% 55% 49% 30%
By district 11% 12% 14% 14% 18% 34%
Both 4% 19% 22% 31% 33% 36%
a Source: Oliver (2001, 177)
Table 4.1 illustrates the diversity in how American governments are struc­
tured. Given the great degree of variation in forms of government, electoral 
rules and provisions for direct democracy—as well as differences within these 
categories when it comes to the specific powers of elected officials, the services 
provided by cities and their spending and taxation—the question is what impact, 
if any, these institutional differences have on political behavior and specifically 
participation.
4 .3  I n c e n t i v e s  a n d  O p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  
R e f o r m e d  a n d  U n r e f o r m e d  G o v e r n m e n t s
While machine politics and boss rule are widely regarded as corrupt and harmful 
to local democracy (see Stone 1996), it is nevertheless the case that the institu­
tions associated with this era gave politicians and local officials incentives to act 
in ways that in fact promote political interest and participation among citizens.
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At the same time, several of the reform government institutions that were in­
troduced by the Progressive movement, limit opportunities for citizen political 
action.
Ostrom, Bish &; Ostrom’s (1988, 28-29) account of how political machines 
act given the incentives they are faced with, is telling: they mobilize candidates; 
give constituents jobs and other benefits in exchange for political support and 
campaign work; bosses became powerful actors and they were often well known 
figures in their communities. A crucial aspect of an effective political machine, 
noted by Oliver (2001) and Welch &; Bledsoe (1988) and others, is that cities 
be divided into small, single-member districts. In this way, politicians have 
a better connection to their constituents, can adapt to their needs and more 
effectively distribute the goods and benefits underpinning the electoral machine. 
At large districts removes this connection. Professional city managers also serve 
to dampen patronage. As Oliver (2001, 179) puts it:
When mayors appoint the heads of city department or are respon­
sible for the disbursement of most city contracts, the opportunities 
for rewarding friends and supporters are high. When such decisions 
are made by a professional city manager . . .  the ability of elected 
officials to manipulate public resources in reward of their supports 
is severely limited. In other words, the ability to manipulate public 
resources to induce partisan participation, the very definition of ma­
chine politics, is greatly restricted when elected officials have only 
indirect control over such resources.
Previous research has tended to produce findings supporting the theory that 
institutions associated with reform governments have a negative effect on polit­
ical participation. The council-manager form of government and non-partisan 
elections are both cited as discouraging people from taking part in local politi­
cal affairs (Cassel 1987, Welch h  Bledsoe 1986). By limiting the role of parties,
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reform institutions suppress important sources of political mobilization, thereby 
making it less likely that citizens get involved.
Furthermore, there is an argument to be made that in nonreformed cities, 
politics tends to be more visible. That is, the central role that mayors play 
means that citizens can easily identify (if not identify with) local political af­
fairs. Famous mayors such those in Chicago, New York, Cincinnati and Kansas 
City were colorful public figures who put local politics front and center. Another 
reason why cities with machine politics might induce higher levels of participa­
tion is that the benefits of participating—patronage appointments, preferential 
contracts, getting on the city payroll—are very real and substantial. In this way, 
machine politics and the patronage tha t goes with it can be seen as one way 
to produce a B-terrn solution to the calculus of voting problem (Dowding 2005, 
442-3). The general conclusion in the vast majority of existing work is that re­
form institutions are associated with less participation (Alford & Lee 1968, Haj- 
nal & Lewis 2003, Kelleher Sz Lowery 2004). However, Oliver (2001, 178), in his 
study of participation and local government institutions, notes that most of the 
previous work in this field has examined only voting and has usually employed 
only aggregate data. Oliver’s analysis—which includes nonelectoral forms of 
political participation—-leads him to conclude that local government institu­
tions have no effect on citizens’ propensities for taking political action. Only 
voting in municipal elections varies with changes in political institutions; none 
of the nonelectoral forms of participation examined by Oliver—contacting offi­
cials, attending board meetings, attending organizational meetings and informal 
activity—are influenced by differences in how city governments are organized 
(Oliver 2001, 183-4).
Oliver (2001) is right to expand the number of indicators of political par­
ticipation beyond voting. The present analysis also looks at both electoral and 
nonelectoral political participation. I take a somewhat different approach to
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Oliver when it comes to operationalizing the institutional independent vari­
ables. When considering reformed versus nonreformed institutions, I argue that 
the expectations about the role of these in political behavior outcomes ought 
not to be as clearcut as some of the literature maintains.
For instance, the impact of provisions for direct democracy on political par­
ticipation should be seen as positive. On the one hand, initiatives and referenda 
have the potential to directly involve citizens. There is empirical work indicating 
that the use of ballot initiatives makes citizens more aware of politics, increases 
interest in politics and has a positive effect on other forms of political partic­
ipation (Bowler Sz Donovan 2002, Smith 2001, Smith 2002, Tolbert, Grummel 
& Smith 2001). On the other hand, such institutions also have the potential 
to involve citizens indirectly through mobilization efforts of interest groups who 
have a stake in the outcome of such races. Indeed, there is a growing body of 
research that maintains that, despite their Progressive Era roots, direct democ­
racy institutions such as the initiative, referendum and recall are fertile ground 
for special interests and machine-like politics (Gerber 1996, Gerber 1999, Ger­
ber, Lupia, McCubbins Sz Kiewiet 2001). Thus the benefits and drawbacks of 
reformed and unreformed local governments are not unambiguous. Whether 
one sees advantages or weaknesses depends on if one is concerned with issues of 
corruption and patronage or citizen apathy.
Thus, there is a need to avoid the tendency to view the impact of local 
government institutions in terms of reformed versus nonreformed governments, 
and instead to simply regard institutions as creating incentives and opportuni­
ties that are either positive for participation or negative. To that end, I analyze 
how the level of political “openness” of cities affects citizens’ propensity for 
political participation. This approach bears some resemblance to the work on 
social movements that employs the concept of political opportunity structures 
(Kriesi 1995, McAdam, McCarthy Sz Zald 1996, Tarrow 1994). Eisinger (1973,
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11-12), in his study of protest politics in American cities, described the ways in 
which the institutional context frames incentives for collective action:
Elements in the environment can impose certain constraints on po­
litical activity or open up avenues for it. The manner in which 
individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not 
simply a function of the resources they command but of the open­
ings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself.
There is, in this sense, interaction or linkage between the environ­
ment, understood in terms of the notion of structure of political 
opportunities, and political behavior (cited in Ulbig 1999, 4).
As Tarrow (1994, 85) puts is, political opportunity structures of are “dimensions 
of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure.” In other 
words, the way in which institutions are organized has implications for how 
citizens view the costs and benefits in the calculus of whether to take political 
action or not.
Following Ulbig (1999), the openness of a city’s political system is measured 
using four aspects of local government institutions: the form of government; the 
electoral system; ballot structure; and provisions for direct democracy. Gover­
nance structures where executive power rests with managers instead of elected 
mayors, and at large districts are considered to contribute to a closed political 
system. Having appointed, professional managers who run city affairs means 
that citizens are one step removed from the process, as opposed to the situation 
in cities where citizens directly elect mayors who have real power. Similarly, non­
partisan ballots are also seen as limiting the openness of a city’s political system 
in that they reduce the amount of information available to voters. Nonpartisan 
elections also eliminate another avenue for citizen involvement in that they cur­
tail party activity and organization. On the other hand, provisions for citizens
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to directly change and introduce legislation and recall elected officials contribute 
to higher levels of openness. These four dimensions are considered together in 
an additive index constructed from data from the International City/County 
Management Association’s Municipal Form of Government Survey} The index 
is a 25 point scale and ranges from 0 (most closed) to 1 (most open). The 
expectation is that citizens residing in more open cities will be more likely to 
participate in politics. Ulbig (1999, 7-8) observes that there could be differ­
ences in the effect of openness on different forms of participation. Ulbig makes 
the case that more open systems, while encouraging all types of participation, 
should have a greater effect on so-called “conventional” forms of participation. 
The logic here is that in cities where the political system is more closed, individ­
uals and groups may have incentives to engage in “nonconventional” political 
activity as the system is less responsive to acts such as voting and contacting 
politicians and officials.
4 .4  R e s u l t s  a n d  D is c u s s io n
Analyses testing the impact of different institutional variables on the five indica­
tors of political participation (not reported here) produced mostly nil findings. 
None of the dependent variables were affected by differences in governance form, 
electoral rules or direct democracy. However, taking these together, as a mea­
sure of the openness, or responsiveness, of the political system does reveal some 
ways in which local political institutions impact on political participation.
The results from the models including the city openness measure are reported 
in Table 4.2. The individual-level effects are largely unaffected by the inclusion 
of city openness. Black Americans are slightly more likely than whites to attend
1For more information on the index and the ICMA survey question wordings, see Appendix
B.
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political meetings and be involved in boycotts or demonstrations; but their odds 
of engaging the other forms of participation are not significantly different from 
whites’. The participation of Asians is lower in all forms of activity, compared 
to whites. Hispanics are also less likely than white Americans to vote or sign 
petitions. However, the probability of being involved in the more unconventional 
form of political activity of demonstrations, is higher for Hispanics than it is for 
whites.
Again, the gender differences that emerge—women being more likely to 
vote and sign petitions; less likely to engage in the other forms of political 
participation—point to differences in resources (most notably time) between 
men and women. The effect for age is consistent across the five dependent vari­
ables: older people are mote likely to take political action than younger people. 
Married people are more likely to vote than their unmarried counterparts. Per­
haps one reason for this is social pressure to vote, it being more difficult to 
hide not nonvoting from a spouse. Married people are, however, significantly 
less active in forms of political participation that require more time and that 
are less conventional. This might signal a kind of lifecycle effect where people 
are more inclined to take part in things like demonstrations before they are 
married and “settle down”. Education, as expected, has a large positive effect 
on political participation. For example, the odds of voting for someone with a 
bachelors degree are more than twice as high as the odds for a person with only 
a highschool diploma. While somewhat smaller, the effects of education on the 
odds of engaging in the other forms of participation are still large. The longer 
an individual has lived their community, the higher the chances are that they 
participate in politics. The same relationship is present for home ownership— 
people who own their homes, have higher probabilities of taking political action. 
In other words, the greater commitment one has to one’s community—and the 
more stake one has in that community—the more likely it is that one invests
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Table 4.2: Local government openness and political participation0
Parameter
Voting6 Petition Pol. meeting Demo/b’cott Pol. group
Fixed Effects
Ind’l-level
Constant 3.861 0.553 0.186 0.066 0.084
(3.526,4.228) (0.513,0.595) (0.172,0.202) (0.057,0.077) (0.077,0.092)
Blackc 0.987 0.709 1.378 1.249 0.978
(0.833,1.168) (0.644,0.782) (1.185,1.601) (1.044,1.494) (0.805,1.189)
Asian 0.340 0.479 0.774 0.556 0.946
(0.263,0.440) (0.374,0.614) (0.650,0.923) (0.344,0.897) (0.717,1.249)
Hispanic 0.589 0.532 1.156 1.351 0.942
(0.499,0.695) (0.475,0.596) (0.964,1.387) (1.064,1.715) (0.761,1.167)
Female 1.234 1.080 0.832 0.945 0.708
(1.110,1.372) (1.004,1.162) (0.759,0.911) (0.824,1.084) (0.641,0.782)
Age 1.111 1.043 1.015 1.003 1.029
(1.093,1.130) (1.027,1.058) (1.000,1.031) (0.971,1.036) (1.002,1.058)
Age2 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.999,1.000) (0.999,1.000) (1.000,1.000) (0.999,1.000) (0.999,1.000)
Married 1.162 1.039 0.894 0.807 0.868
(1.050,1.287) (0.950,1.137) (0.801,0.997) (0.694,0.939) (0.764,0.986)
Education 2.153 1.454 1.545 1.343 1.696
(2.011,2.305) (1.392,1.520) (1.486,1.608) (1.244,1.449) (1.599,1.799)
Years in com. 1.081 1.093 1.101 1.043 1.132
(1.043,1.121) (1.061,1.127) (1.061,1.143) (0.988,1.101) (1.091,1.176)
Home owner 1.662 1.180 1.284 1.107 1.209
(1.497,1.845) (1.079,1.290) (1.151,1.432) (0.898,1.365) (1.057,1.382)
City-level
Openness 0.916 1.351 1.341 1.562 1.029
(0.661,1.267) (0.991,1.840) (0.994,1.810) (0.937,2.605) (1.005,1.054)
Pop. (logged) 1.063 1.056 1.020 1.093 1.070
(1.015,1.112) (1.011,1.102) (0.979,1.063) (1.023,1.167) (1.024,1.118)
Random Effectsd
City-level (r00) 0.449*** 0.450*** 0.387*** 0.527*** 0.293***
Asian (7 0 7 ) 1.046*** 0.387*** 0.880*** 1.026
Hispanic (ros) *0.685** 0.530
Black (7-0 9 ) 0.580*** 0.432*** 0.457
ICC (p) 0.120 0.120 0.105 0.138 0.082
Deviance 39920.220 48302.369 43223.445 37916.834 38670.366
a N=15,629; J=1139. Estimates are from logistic models estimated using maximum likelihood in HLM; 
entries are odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; see Appendix A and B for exact 
question wordings and coding; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1%.
 ^Non-citizens excluded from voting models; N=14,686; J=1107.
c Excluded category for race is “white”.
^ Only those variables that had statistically significant variance components in the level-1 models were 
kept as random effects in subsequent models.
in the community by participating in politics. Home ownership in particular, 
raises the stakes of local politics since decisions on where to build hospitals, 
develop schools, or put highways, to name a few, all have an impact on the 
value of property.
When it comes to the effect of city political system openness, the results 
axe somewhat ambiguous. Voting has a negative relationship to city openness, 
but the confidence interval around this estimate is too wide to treat it with 
any degree of certainty. City openness is related to higher odds of signing 
petitions, attending political meetings, going to demonstrations or boycotting as 
well as political group activity. Again, as the confidence intervals indicate, these 
estimates should be treated with caution; indeed the estimates are statistically 
significant only at the 10% level. Nevertheless, for these types of nonelectoral 
participation there does appear to be an effect from political system openness— 
albeit a weak one.
To get a better indication of these relationships, Figure 4.1 presents predicted 
probabilities of political participation at different levels of city openness. On the 
y-axis are predicted probabilities from the models in Table 4.2. Along the x-axis 
are values of the openness index across the range found in the data. The index 
has been centered around the grand mean, with a mean of 0. The probabilities 
are conditional on all other variables in the model being held at their means. 
Ninetyfive percent confidence intervals are represented by the dotted lines. As 
the figure makes clear, moving from the most closed city (Anaheim, California 
for example) to the most open (St. Louis), entails only a very modest drop 
in the probability of voting and these probabilities are predicted with quite 
low confidence. In other words, there is virtually no statistical or substantive 
effect of political system openness on voting. However, again it should be noted 
that this is voting in a Presidential election and therefore, it is unlikely that 
the nature of local government institutions will play a large role. The other
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Figure 4.1: The effect of city political system openness on political participation. 
The solid lines are predicted probabilities of the dependent variable for the 
valid range of the Openness index, holding all other variables at their means. 
The dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. The confidence intervals were 
calculated taking into account the uncertainty of the estimated coefficients in 
the regressions (fts and estimated standard errors). Values of Openness have 
been centered around the mean (Openness — Openness).
four indicators of political participation are positively influenced by openness of 
the local political environment. The slopes of these relationships are all quite 
shallow, however. Thus the substantive effect of openness is not dramatic.
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4 .5  C o n c l u s io n
In this chapter I have argued that institutions structure incentives for collec­
tive action and examined how differences in local government institutions af­
fect political participation. The ways in which government executive structures 
are organized and representatives elected varies greatly among American cities. 
Some cities also provide for the direct involvement of citizens in enacting leg­
islation through various provisions. The prevailing contention of the literature 
is that the institutional reforms brought in during the Progressive Era served 
to dampen participation. However, the findings presented here indicate, on 
the one hand, that individual effects of institutions are more or less nonexis­
tent across the indicators of political participation studied. On the other hand, 
when combined into a measure of city political openness in order to tap polit­
ical opportunity structures, local government institutions do have an effect on 
participation—though these effects are substantively small.
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Chapter 5
The Illusory Effect of Social Capital
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5 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
The concept of social capital has recently come to be used to explain myriad 
ails and wonders in society; among these political participation. The focus of 
much of the recent research on political and civic engagement in the United 
States has been on the apparent decline of participation in the post-war era 
(Paxton 1999, Putnam 2000). Discussions of low and declining levels politi­
cal participation in America are not new. Lately however, the issue has been 
increasingly coupled with discussions about lower levels of social capital and 
civic engagement in general, with a steady stream of journal articles, books and 
media coverage following Robert Putnam ’s lead (1995a, 19956, 2000). The re­
ported decline of social capital in America has received much attention from a 
wide spectrum of scholars who argue that it has serious implications for areas 
as diverse as crime and neighborhood safety (Glaeser, Sacerdote Sz Scheinkman 
1995, Putnam 2000), health (Kawachi, Kennedy Sz Glass 1999, Veenstra 2001), 
the economy (Fukuyama 1995, Knack Sz Keefer 1997), trust in government and 
other institutions (Keele 2004, Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer Sz Vishny 2000) and 
government responsiveness (Knack 2002, Putnam 1993).
When it comes to political participation, there are two streams of argument 
from the social capitalists. One line of research suggests that the attitudinal 
aspects of social capital are important factors in explaining why some people 
take part in politics and others do not. Activity in voluntary (non-political) 
associations infuses members with attitudes and values such as norms of reci­
procity and trust (Putnam 2000, Stolle 1999). These, it is said, are precisely the 
attitudes necessary for political participation. A second argument concentrates 
more on the effects of networks on recruiting individuals into political partic­
ipation. That is, being involved in all manner of non-political groups makes 
it more likely that a person will be asked to get involved in a political cause. 
Verba, Schlozman Sz Brady have further argued that the skills and resources
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required for political participation are gained through activity in non-political 
institutions such as school, the workplace and church (1995, 269-73). Accord­
ing to the social capital theory of political participation, low levels of political 
participation in areas or among groups is a result of one, or a combination of 
both, the attitudinal and recruitment mechanisms.
In this Chapter, I test the social capital account of political participation. I 
question the links between social capital and political engagement, arguing that 
previous work in the field is characterized by a gap between the theory of social 
capital and empirical tests of the effects of the concept, leading to potentially 
erroneous results. W hat sets social capital apart is its focus on social relations 
and social structure, yet nearly all empirical work uses individual-level mea­
sures of the concept. Thus, with a more lucid account of the theory and more 
appropriate operationalization of social capital that recognizes the community, 
or macro-level, nature of the concept, it is possible to more rigourously assess 
its impact on political participation within and between communities. Before 
testing whether social capital is a good predictor of political participation, how­
ever, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the empirical evidence underpinning 
claims made about the roots of social capital. That is, does activity in voluntary 
associations lead to the norms of reciprocity and trust claimed by Putnam and 
others (e.g. Putnam 1993, Putnam 2000, Wollebaek & Selle 2003)?
The Chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I begin by outlining 
the theory of social capital, how it has been conceptualized and operationalized 
and the hypotheses about the connection between social capital and political 
participation that grow out of this conceptualization. Section 5.3 assesses the 
hypothesized link between civic engagement (activity in voluntary associations 
and other face-to-face interaction) and generalized trust, which is central to the 
social capital literature. I offer an alternative explanation of generalized trust 
that rests on life satisfaction. In section 5.4 I test the claims made about the
relationship between political participation and social capital. I first specify a 
model that uses the common individual-level measures of social capital. The 
performance of this model in reducing inter-city variance is compared to ones 
where social capital is included.
5 .2  S o c ia l  C a p it a l
Social capital is the idea that the relationships between people and the norms 
and attitudes these relationships foster, can be productive. That is, in the 
same way that tools or machines (physical capital) or an individual’s education 
and skills (human capital) can be productive, dense networks of association 
can facilitate production. It has been argued that social capital is important 
because it enables people to achieve ends that in its absence would not be 
possible (Coleman 1988).
For Coleman, social capital is a capital resource that comes about in relations 
between persons. Several different aspects of social relations can constitute 
social capital. These include trust, obligations, and expectations; information 
channels; and norms and sanctions (Coleman 1988, S102-5). Coleman defines 
social capital as follows:
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but 
a variety of entities having two characteristics in common: They all 
consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain 
actions of individuals within the structure. Like other forms of cap­
ital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement 
of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. Like 
physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely 
fungible, but may be fungible with respect to specific activities. . . . 
Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of 
relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in 
individuals nor in physical implements of production (Coleman 1990,
302).
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Coleman’s definition captures the central elements of social capital—namely the 
importance of social structure—but suffers from the fact that it defines social 
capital in terms of its function. That is, according to a strict reading of Cole­
man’s definition, social capital does not exist if it cannot be shown to have a 
causal effect (Teorell 2000, 2). This is, however, an empirical question and not 
one of definition. However, Coleman’s emphasis on social structure is an impor­
tant one. Putnam, in his account of institutional performance in Italy’s regions, 
defines social capital as, “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, 
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putnam 1993, 167).1 Putnam ’s use of the term is problematic in that 
it also confuses issues of definition with those of empirical investigation. Is social 
capital to be understood as networks of connections between people, as some 
outcome of these networks—norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness—or is it 
both at the same time? It is ambiguous, to say the least, to define a concept 
both in terms of its cause and effect. The literature following Putnam ’s early 
writings has tended to fall into one of two categories:
1. adopting a view of social capital as a resource inhering in social structure 
and focusing on membership in networks;
2. regarding social capital as an attitudinal property, consisting of norms of 
reciprocity and generalized trust, these attitudes being generated through 
face-to-face interaction.2
According to its proponents, generalized trust is important because it lubricates 
social interaction and the business of everyday life—it reduces transaction costs. 
As Putnam (2000) puts it, “I’ll do this for you now, without expecting anything 
immediately in return and perhaps down the road you or someone else will return 
the favour  A society that relies on generalized reciprocity is more efficient
1 Putnam uses this definition in his later work on social capital in the USA as well. 
In his most recent work, Bowling Alone, he defines social capital as, “connections among 
individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them” (Putnam 2000, 19).
2See, for example, Foley & Edwards (1999) and Newton (2001).
90
than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than 
barter” (2000, 134-5). In the rest of this section, I outline some of the problems 
with the ways in which social capital has been conceptualized.
5.2.1 T r u s t  a n d  S o c ia l  S t r u c t u r e
The more active a person is in a wide variety of associations and groups, the 
more trusting they will be of the generalized other, according to social capital 
theory. Here however, we run into several problems. First, there is the problem 
of self-selection. Perhaps people who join groups are simply psychologically 
predisposed to being more trusting. Without detailed longitudinal data, this 
claim is difficult to test. Second, trust may be endogenous. That is, it seems 
reasonable to assume a certain level of trust is needed at the outset to overcome 
collective action problems when forming the group. Now this obviously does not 
imply that participants necessarily will not enjoy increased levels of trust once 
the group is up and running, but it does suggest we need to consider alternative 
sources of trust. Third, is the problem of mistrust.
There are two, partially related, aspects to the problem of mistrust. The 
first concerns the role of trust and mistrust in democratic society. The idea of 
generalized trust rests on the assumption that people transfer the trust they 
develop over time in particular relations with people to the general population. 
As Offe points out, individuals in democracies cannot choose who is to belong 
to “the people”, and as such, there is no way to know whether a fellow citizen is 
trustworthy simply based on their membership of the same democratic society 
(1999, 56-7). The costs of gathering such information are prohibitive to the 
point of being insurmountable (Hardin 1992) and therefore one ought to expect 
democracy to be characterized by distrust. Second, assuming a tight link be­
tween trust and participation, as social capitalists do, disregards the potential 
of mistrust as a catalyst for participation. Consider a parent who has the choice
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to participate or not at the meeting of the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) 
in his or her child’s school district. If the parent has confidence in the ability of 
the teachers and other parents to make informed decisions about the curriculum 
or whatever issue may be on the agenda, there is no reason for them to attend 
the meeting beyond the purely social function it serves. If I trust that other 
people are going to make correct decisions, or at least similar decisions to those 
I would make myself, I am better off letting others decide. If, on the other hand, 
the parent suspects that his or her fellow PTA members cannot be trusted to 
make decisions in the best interest of their child, they would do well to attend 
the meeting in order to ensure that their preferences are taken into account.
There is often a disconnect between the theory of social capital and empir­
ical tests of this theory. In the theory of social capital, much is made of the 
importance of social structure. The nature of the connections and networks 
between people is believed to shape the nature, usefulness and existence of the 
stock of social capital available to members of network. One of the clearest 
statements of the centrality of social structure to social capital comes from an 
example provided by James Coleman. In order to illustrate the importance of 
social structure in creating and maintaining trust, that in turn acts as a resource 
for groups, Coleman uses the example of wholesale diamond markets:
Wholesale diamond markets exhibit a property that to an outsider 
is remarkable. In the process of a sale, a merchant will hand over 
to another merchant a bag of stones for the latter to examine in 
private at his leisure, with no formal insurance that the latter will 
not substitute one or more inferior stones or a paste replica. The 
merchandize may be worth thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of 
dollars. Such free exchange of stones for inspection is important to 
the functioning of this market. In its absence, the market would 
operate in a much more cumbersome, much less efficient fashion 
(1988, S98).
As Coleman points out, several features of this market highlight the importance 
of different aspects of social structure. First, this is a closed system in which
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merchants interact with each other repeatedly. That is, the same agents are 
involved in a long-term relationship with one another; in contrast to, for ex­
ample, strangers dealing with each other in a one-shot interaction like a taxi 
driver and his or her fare. The point here is that defection on the part of 
the inspecting merchant (replacing a few paste replicas) carries with it almost 
certain detection and sanctions since the merchants will deal with each other 
again and, furthermore, other merchants in the market observe the behavior. 
But not only is trust maintained through these professional structures; the di­
amond market is such that its members share religious, family and community 
ties. This enforces the norm of trust further because, were it to be broken, the 
consequences are not only professional, but also entail losing a wider network 
of contacts (Coleman 1988, S99).
Thus, there are certain problems in conceptualizing social capital as trust 
simpliciter and measuring it using responses to survey questions such as the 
ubiquitous “Do you think most people can be trusted, or do you think you 
can’t be too careful when dealing with people” . This survey item no doubt 
measures something, but it is highly doubtful that it taps the kind of trust 
described in the diamond market example.
5 .2 .2  U n r a v e l in g  T r u s t  a n d  S o c ia l  S t r u c t u r e
I contend that it is conceptually dubious to include attitudes of trust and norms 
of reciprocity in the definition of social capital. Social capital, remember, is a 
resource that inheres in the relations between people—in the social structure 
surrounding individuals (Coleman 1990, 302). If social capital is to be useful 
as a concept it needs to be differentiated from other forms of capital—physical, 
financial, human. Surely the key feature that demarcates the arena of social 
capital is that it is a resource available to individuals with access to a network. 
That is, access to the social structure that surrounds them as opposed to ac­
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cess to physical implements of production, money, or education, knowledge and 
skills. The willingness to abide by norms of reciprocity and the trustworthiness 
of others are individual attitudes that can be held in isolation from—or even in 
opposition to—the attitudes of others around us. As Teorell points out, “I can 
trust everyone I come across, but that does not mean that they trust me nor 
that they trust each other” (2000, 4).
At the heart of the argument about social capital’s wider effects is the notion 
that civic engagement and the interpersonal trust among associational members 
leads to generalized trust. However, social capital is to be found in the relations 
between people and does not dwell as a trait within individuals. Thus, I argue 
that social capital is specific to just those relations in which it resides and does 
not transfer outside these. Human capital, simply put, refers to a person’s 
skills, education, knowledge, health etc. and as such is explicitly individual. 
Human capital differs in important ways from financial or physical capital. As 
Becker puts it, “. . .  you cannot separate a person from his or her knowledge, 
skills, health, or values the way it is possible to move financial or physical assets 
while the owner stays put” (1993 [1964], 16). In the same way that you cannot 
separate a person from their human capital, you cannot take social capital out 
of the specific relations where it resides. That is, there is no reason to believe 
that the social capital in the form of trust among merchants in the New York 
wholesale diamond market can be transformed into some form of generalized 
trust. The trust is not carried from situation to situation by individuals but 
rather, is unique to the relations among merchants in that setting. Coleman 
expresses this feature of social structure and trust: “A does something for B 
and trusts B to reciprocate in the future. This creates an expectation in A 
and an obligation on the part of B” (1988, S102). A and B act within a closed 
system and thus A’s expectations of future reciprocation cannot reasonably be 
expected to be fulfilled by some actor C who is not part of the network.
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It is not inevitable, or even perhaps likely, that the trust and norms built 
up among agents in closed systems with unique social structures, such as the 
diamond market, will be transferable to dealings with fish mongers or any 
other strangers with whom interaction is not repeated and, crucially, observed 
by others with whom a potential defector will have to interact. In other words, 
social capital should not be seen as an individual property that follows wherever 
the individual goes. Rather, it is specific to the relations in which it is built up. 
Individuals who are members of social capital rich relations may well learn skills 
that are transferable to other social networks and that might indeed foster the 
creation of social capital in these networks, but that is properly understood as 
human capital.
5 .3  S o c ia l  T r u s t  a n d  t h e  I m p a c t  o f  In t e r a c t io n  a n d
P a r t ic ip a t io n
Before going on to analyze the effects of social capital on political participation, 
it is useful to more thoroughly explore the empirical underpinnings of the con­
cept itself. As discussed in the previous section, the idea of social capital—as 
it is portrayed in the literature—largely rests on the relationship between ac­
tivity in formal and informal networks, on the one hand, and the creation of 
generalized trust, on the other hand (see especially Putnam 2000, Stolle 1999). 
The nature of this relationship tends to be assumed to work such that activity 
in networks—social relations—leads to generalized trust. In order to assess this 
claim, I examine the impact of various forms of social interaction on generalized, 
or social, trust.
Social trust is measured here using questions from the Benchmark Survey on 
whether respondents trust people in their neighborhood, co-workers, shop clerks,
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co-religionists, local police and ‘most people’. These kinds of questions are 
common in the social capital literature and social trust is often operationalized 
using such items. An index of the scores for these questions was created. The 
index was calculated as the mean of the standardized responses to the five 
questions. My measures of social interaction are also quite standard and consist 
of the following: Group involvement measures the number of formal groups a 
respondent is involved in and is a count of activity in eighteen different groups 
over the past twelve months. Volunteering is a count of the number of times 
respondents reported having volunteered for various groups and organizations 
during the past year. While group membership and activity and volunteering 
tap engagement in formal networks, the social capital literature also stresses the 
importance of informal social interaction. To that end, an index of informal face- 
to-face activity was created. The Schmooz index was created from responses to 
questions in the Benchmark Survey asking how often respondents have friends 
at home; visit with relatives; socialize with co-workers outside of work; hang 
out with friends in public places; play cards and board games. Again, the index 
is calculated as the mean of the standardized responses to the five questions 
(see Appendix A for descriptive statistics, full question wordings and codings).3 
The expectation from social capital theory of the effect of the various measures 
of formal and informal interaction is that the relationship should be a positive 
one. That is, the more informal and formal networking an individual does, the 
more social trust they should have.
Recent work on social capital has suggested that it is not only the volume of 
interaction that is important in generating social, or generalized, trust, but that 
we need to take into account the nature of that interaction as well. Specifically, 
it is argued that social capital will be more productive for society when it is 
of the “bridging” kind as opposed to “bonding” social capital—bridging social
3Credit for the name for the schmooz index goes to Bob Putnam.
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capital brings with it greater positive externalities for society at large (Putnam 
2000). Bridging social capital refers to the interaction of individuals who are 
different from one another on some dimension (race, gender, class et cetera) 
while bonding social capital is that produced by ties between people who are 
similar (Putnam 2000, 22-24). In order to tap this aspect of social capital, I 
use a measure of the diversity of respondents’ friends. This index is a count 
of how many different kinds of personal friends the respondent has from eleven 
possible types (see Appendix A .l for more details on the index). Thus, according 
to social capital theory, the more diverse a person’s set of friends is, the more 
social trust they will have.
Table 5.1: The impact of formal and informal 
interaction on social trusta
Variable: Estimate
Fixed effects
Group involvement 0.002
(0.002)
Volunteering 0.001**
(0.000)
Schmoozing 0.022***
(0.008)
Diversity of friendships 0.015***
(0.002)
Constant 0.114***
(0.007)
Random Effects
City-level variance ( t o o ) 0.066***
Individual-level variance (a2) 0.481
a N=14,017; J=634. Dependent variable is the social 
trust index; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Estimates are OLS coefficients; 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls for 
race, education, income, gender, age and marital 
status included.
Table 5.1 presents results from a model testing the impact of the formal and 
informal social interaction variables as well as the diversity of friendships index 
on social trust. The model also controls for respondents’ sociodemographic
characteristics and length of residence at their current address.4 An effect of
4Table 5.1 and the subsequent tables in this chapter only present the coefficients from the 
main social capital variables; see Appendix D for the complete tables.
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volunteering and informal socializing on social trust does indeed exist. Both 
variables have positive and significant effects on social trust. The more a person 
volunteers and spends time schmoozing with friends and colleagues, the higher 
the level of social trust they report having. However, the substantive effect 
of these variables, in particular volunteering, on social trust is quite small. 
Controlling for other factors, volunteering one more time per year, increases a 
respondent’s score on the social trust index by a mere 0.001. In other words 
a person who increases their voluntary activity by volunteering even as much 
as once a month more (carrying with it an increase of .012 on the social trust 
index), is not appreciably more trusting than a person who does no volunteering 
at all. Informal socializing appears to exert a stronger effect on social trust. It 
is the case that people who report spending more time interacting with friends, 
neighbors and colleagues also have higher scores on social trust.
Having a more diverse set of friends also means one will have more social 
trust. This result is not surprising and is in line with the expectations from 
social capital theory. If one is exposed to a wide variety of positive signals from 
diverse others—in this case, friends who are different from oneself—one learns to 
regard strangers who are different with less apprehension. If, however, the only 
people one consistently socializes with are just like oneself, one will probably 
develop a certain level of suspicion toward those that are not. This goes to the 
heart of the distinction between so-called bonding and bridging social capital. 
Both forms can be beneficial to individuals or groups. However, the latter, it 
is argued, is more productive of ends that benefit society at large for the very 
reason that it is more likely to foster generalized trust (Putnam 2000, Marschall 
Sz Stolle 2004)—and as Putnam puts it, trustworthiness of this kind, “lubricates 
social life” (2000, 21).
Formal social interaction, as measured by membership and activity in vari­
ous groups and associations, has no statistically significant effect on social trust.
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One of the most common measures of social capital in the political science lit­
erature is membership in civic associations such as the ones used here (see for 
example Hall 1999, Hooghe 2003, Maloney, Smith & Stoker 2000, Wollebask k, 
Selle 2003). The problem with many of these studies is that associational mem­
bership is considered important simply because a statistically significant effect 
is found between memberships and some desirable outcome—be it democratic 
accountability, absence of corruption, political participation or indeed social, or 
generalized, trust. On the one hand, to the extent that associations are used to 
explain social trust, this approach disregards the importance of differentiating 
between kinds of associations. Furthermore, numerous studies rely on voluntary 
association activity as the sole measure of interaction—as the current analysis 
and others show, informal socializing may well be the more salient measure. On 
the other hand, when a direct link is posited between associational activity and 
desirable social outcomes, the social interaction-to-generalized trust mechanism 
is ignored.
It would seem that not all social interaction is equally valuable when it 
comes to predicting social trust. Informal networks have a stronger effect on 
generalized trust than formal ones. Among formal interaction, it is volunteering 
that has an effect while group membership and activity has no effect. Finally, 
individuals who interact with a more diverse set of people are also more socially 
trusting. The evidence for the link between social interaction and social trust 
is mixed. However, perhaps it is not social interaction which is driving social 
trust, but something else entirely. Being more trusting signals a certain opti­
mism and positive outlook. Being more secure may make it easier to place trust 
in people—in a sense, being more secure makes it less of a risk to bet on some­
one else’s trustworthiness. In order to test this argument, I add a measure of 
how happy respondents report being and one of their personal economic satisfac­
tion. Respondents to the Benchmark Survey were asked, “All things considered,
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would you say you are very happy, happy, not very happy or not happy at all?” 
Economic satisfaction was measured by the question: “We are interested in how 
people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family 
are concerned, would you say that you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, 
or not at all satisfied with your present financial situation?” Results from this 
model are presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Life satisfaction and social trust"
Variable: Estimate
Fixed effects
Social interaction
Group involvement 0.001
(0.002)
Volunteering 0.000
(0.000)
Schmoozing 0.017***
(0.007)
Diversity of friendships 0.013***
(0.002)
Life satisfaction
Happiness 0.146***
(0.008)
Economic satisfaction 0.057***
(0.007)
Constant 0.111***
(0.007)
Random effects
City-level variance ( t o o ) 0.060***
Individual-level variance (a2) 0.471
a N=14,153; J=690. Dependent variable is the social 
trust index; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Estimates are OLS coefficients; 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls for 
race, education, income, gender, age and marital 
status included.
Both happiness and economic satisfaction are highly significant positive pre­
dictors of social trust. The happier one is and the more financially secure one 
is, the higher the score on the social trust index. Including these measures 
also has an impact on the effect of social interaction on social trust. The size 
of the effect for both schmoozing and diversity of friendships, although still 
significant, decreases slightly upon the inclusion of happiness and economic sat­
isfaction. When it comes to the variables measuring formal social interaction—
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group involvement and volunteering—the addition of life satisfaction causes the 
previously significant coefficient for volunteering to become insignificant. Two 
tentative conclusions can be drawn from this. First, life satisfaction seems to 
be an important predictor of generalized trust. Second, the fact that the effect 
of informal social interaction is robust to the inclusion of life satisfaction, is 
further evidence that this, and not formal interaction, is the more important 
measure of social interaction when it comes to generalized trust.
An important criticism of studies positing a relationship going from social 
interaction to generalized trust is that this work does not deal with the poten­
tial endogeneity in this relationship. These models simply cannot answer the 
question of whether it is interaction that causes trust or if people who are more 
trusting interact more. The same criticism can of course also be leveled at the 
analysis including life satisfaction. Perhaps people who are more trusting de­
velop a sunnier outlook on life. However, the purpose of the analysis above is to 
illustrate the problems inherent in extant empirical work on social capital. On 
the one hand, social interaction of the kind usually focused on by the social cap­
ital literature appears to be a poor predictor of generalized trust; on the other 
hand, even those measures that do predict social trust may be endogenous. In 
either case serious doubt is cast on the usefulness of these models. By exten­
sion, one can conclude that the attitudinal social capital argument for political 
participation rests on shaky foundations at best. Recall that this argument 
holds that participation in non-political activity leads to norms such as trust, 
which in turn have a positive effect on individuals’ propensity to participate in 
politics.
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5 .4  D o e s  S o c ia l  C a p it a l  W o r k  in  t h e  C it y ?
I now turn to the analysis of the impact of social capital on political partici­
pation. There are two strands of argument when it comes to this relationship. 
One says that it is the attitudes created in non-political, face-to-face interac­
tion that are important. These attitudes include trust-specifically generalized 
trust—and norms of reciprocity and cooperation. Attitudes such as these, it 
is said, make it more likely that people will participate in politics. The other 
theory of social capital’s impact on political participation argues that activity 
in all kinds of non-political interaction makes it more likely that individuals will 
be recruited into political activity. As Verba, Schlozman & Brady illustrate, 
one reason why people do not participate is because no one asked them to. In 
other words, the chances of being asked to take part in politics increase if one 
goes from watching TV to the bowling alley.
The results from the analysis in section 5.3, where generalized trust was 
modeled as a function of formal and informal social interaction, raises serious 
doubts about the existence of a positive causal relationship between social in­
teraction and trust. The absence of such a strong link suggests that, insofar 
as social capital has en effect on political participation, it is through mobi­
lization. This, however, begs the question: if social capital is telling us that 
people get mobilized into political participation through involvement with dif­
ferent kinds of civic groups, what is this theory adding that we do not already 
know from the vast literature dealing explicitly with mobilization (e.g. Gerber 
& Green 2000, Leighley 1996, Rosenstone Sc Hansen 1994)?
5 .4 .1  T h e  I m p a c t  o f  S o c ia l  I n t e r a c t i o n  a n d  G e n e r a l i z e d  T r u s t  o n  
P o l it ic a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n
I am arguing that if social capital is to be a useful concept in the social sciences, 
and not simply another term for human capital or mobilization, it needs to be
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conceived of as a community-level phenomenon. As such, it is at the community 
level that it should have an impact on political participation. In other words, 
the magnitude of the city-level variance component, Too, ought to decrease once 
we control for social capital. Given this argument, my empirical strategy in this 
chapter involves fitting a number of nested models and examining the inter-city 
variation in the dependent variables. For clarity, I present the table with results 
from the empty model in Chapter 2 again.
Table 5.3: ANOVA°
Parameter
Voting Petition Political meeting Dem o/boycott Political gr
Fixed Effects 
Constant (700) 1.060* -0.358* -1.470* -2.393* -2.102*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.052) (0.042)
Random Effects 
City-Level Variance (too) 0.334* 0.415* 0.327* 0.454* 0.303*
(0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.052) (0.029)
Intraclass correlation (p ) 0.092 0.112 0.090 0.121 0.084
Deviance 38384.286 41152.177 36948.140 32347.636 33108.067
° N=14,017 (12,969 for voting); J=656 (619 for voting). * significant at .01%. Estimates are 
from a logistic model estimated using maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in 
parentheses.
As I showed in Chapter 2, the between-city variance of each indicator of 
political participation is considerable. The intraclass correlation coefficients for 
the dependent variables are 9.2% for voting, 11.2% for signing petitions and 9% 
for political meetings. Demonstrations/boycotts and political group activity 
have ICCs of 12.1% and 8.4% respectively. The question now is, how is this 
between-city variation affected by the various measures of social capital?
I begin the examination of social capital’s effects on political participation by 
limiting the analysis to the social interaction variables described above—formal 
group involvement, schmoozing and diversity of friendships. The results from 
this model, which includes the same controls for socio-demographics as earlier 
models, are presented in Table 5.4. Leaving aside the issue of the impact of 
these measures on the city-level variance components, it is evident tha t indi­
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viduals’ propensity to take political action is influenced by the extent to which 
they interact socially. Formal group involvement has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on all five indicators of political participation. The more active 
a person is in different groups, the more likely it is that they participate in both 
electoral and nonelectoral politics. The diversity of respondents’ friendships 
displays a similar effect. People who have more diverse friends are more likely 
to vote, sign petitions, attend political meetings, take part in demonstrations or 
boycotts and to be active in a political group. The results for informal socializ­
ing, on the other hand, are more mixed. The more a person socializes informally 
with friends and colleagues, the more likely he or she is to have signed a petition 
and attended a political meeting. However, there is no statistically significant 
effect of schmoozing on the other three forms of political paxticipation. Given 
that schmoozing was the strongest predictor of generalized trust among the so­
cial interaction variables, this might be suggestive of the lack of a relationship 
between generalized trust and political participation. Of course, a better test 
of this is to include a direct measure of generalized trust in the model; which I 
do below.
Turning now to the effect of these social interaction measures on the between- 
community variance in political participation, it is clear that social capital, at 
least when conceived of in this way, does not contribute much to our understand­
ing of differences in political participation across communities. The magnitude 
of the variance component Too for voting does drop by a little less than a third, 
indicating that for this type of political participation, the variables in the model 
do explain some of the differences across communities. The other variance com­
ponents for the other four indicators also decrease in size, but in substantive 
terms, this reduction is slight.
Table 5.5 shows the results from the model when generalized trust is in­
cluded. Generalized trust has a significant effect on four out of the five indi-
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Table 5.4: Face-to-face interaction, group membership and political
participation0
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Demo/boycott Pol. group
Fixed Effects 
Face-to-face interaction  
Group involvement 0.137*** 0.197*** 0.279*** 0.249*** 0.448***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.090)
Schmoozing -0.062 0.125*** 0.126** 0.048 -0.067
(0.050) (0.031) (0.048) (0.071) (0.062)
Diversity of friendships 0.061*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.131*** 0.051***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 1.486*** -0.539*** -1.817*** -2.856*** -2.911***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.076) (0.068)
Random Effects 
City-level Variance ( t o o ) 0.232 0.412*** 0.299*** 0.427*** 0.268***
Intraclass correlation (p ) 0.066 0.111 0.083 0.115 0.075
-2 x Log Likelihood 34962.167 41923.137 37396.546 33568.032 33003.514
a N=13,998; J=633. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
cators of political participation. However, this effect is positive only when it 
comes to voting. People who are more trusting also vote more. But individuals 
who score higher on the social trust index report attending fewer political meet­
ings, being involved in fewer demonstrations and boycotts and are less active in 
political groups. Generalized trust has no effect on individuals’ propensity to 
sign petitions. Differences in the direction of the effect for voting and the other 
types of political participation underscore the broader differences between these 
indicators. The nonelectoral forms of participation on which generalized trust 
has a negative effect are more conflictual (or at least potentially more conflict- 
ual) and group oriented than voting. By that I mean attending a meeting or 
demonstration, or being active in a political group, is a signal that the individ­
ual is identifying with a certain group or cause. If one attends a demonstration 
or participates in a boycott, one is essentially saying that some aspect of society 
needs to be changed; one is expressing a preference for social change. As such, it 
is not surprising that generalized trust has a negative impact on these measures 
of political participation. On the other hand, distrust as a catalyst for political
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participation can also be a result of a rational decision to get involved when 
one feels one’s views would otherwise be misrepresented or when one makes a 
calculation that getting involved will not make a difference.
Table 5.5: Face-to-face interaction, group membership, generalized trust and 
political participation0
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Dem o/boycott Pol. group
Fixed Effects 
Group involvement 0.136*** 0.197*** 0.280*** 0.249*** 0.448***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Schmoozing -0.066 0.124*** 0.129*** 0.051 -0.063
(0.049) (0.031) (0.049) (0.071) (0.063)
Diversity of friendships 0.057*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.135*** 0.054***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Generalized trust 0.243*** 0.054 -0.170*** -0.287*** -0.271***
(0.056) (0.047) (0.060) (0.083) (0.089)
Constant 1.483*** -0.541*** -1.814*** -2.852*** -2.909***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.077) (0.068)
Random Effects 
City-level Variance ( t o o ) 0.232 0.412*** 0.296*** 0.418*** 0.262***
Intraclass correlation (p ) 0.066 0.111 0.083 0.113 0.074
-2 x Log Likelihood 34935.418 41921.401 37385.236 33546.859 32987.497
° N=13,998; J=633. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
The effects of formal and informal face-to-face interaction remain largely 
unchanged with the addition of generalized trust. Crucially, so do the variance 
components for between-city differences in political participation. Indeed, there 
is essentially no change in the magnitude of these variances. That is, social 
capital as neither social interaction nor generalized trust, does particularly well 
in explaining the differences in political participation in American communities 
that persists after controlling for individual-level socio-demographic variables.
Finally, I estimate a model in which I include a number of city-level variables. 
There are two reasons for this. First, I want to test the effect of the social 
capital measures once institutional factors are controlled for. Second, I want to 
examine the combined effect of all the variables on the city-level variance in the 
dependent variables. I report the results from these models in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6: The effect of social capital controlling for political institutions0
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Demo/boycott Pol. group
Fixed Effects 
Group involvement 0.135*** 0.197*** 0.275*** 0.250*** 0.448***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Schmoozing -0.069** 0.125*** 0.144** 0.056 -0.066
(0.034) (0.032) (0.056) (0.073) (0.063)
Diversity of friendships 0.058*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.134*** 0.055***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
Generalized trust 0.248*** 0.056 -0.147** -0.275*** -0.266***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.064) (0.091) (0.089)
Constant 1.466*** -0.539*** -1.826*** 2.947*** -2.932***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.085) (0.068)
Random Effects 
City-level Variance (t o o ) 0.126 0.350*** 0.225*** 0.245*** 0.132**
Intraclass correlation (p) 0.037 0.096 0.064 0.069 0.039
-2 x Log Likelihood 34908.387 41887.759 37357.931 33494.946 32956.079
a N=13,998; J=633. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Controlling for political institutions—such as the city’s form of governance 
(mayor or council-manager), provisions for direct democracy and the level of 
municipal taxation—and various indicators of social context—population den­
sity, racial diversity, median age, unemployment and the rate of home-ownership 
in the city—does not alter the effect of the traditional measures of social capital. 
Individuals who are involved in more groups, axe also more likely to participate 
in all the forms of political action analyzed, even after controlling for city-level 
factors. The same effect persists for the diversity of respondents’ friendships. 
Generalized trust remains a positive predictor for voting and is negatively re­
lated to attending political meetings, demonstrations and boycotts as well as 
political group activity. The one coefficient that does change once I control for 
institutions and social context is that of informal social interaction’s effect on 
voting. In this model, the coefficient for schmoozing is negative and statisti­
cally significant. The more people interact casually with friends, neighbors and 
colleagues, the lower the probability is that they voted.
Figure 5.1 shows graphically the impact—or nonimpact—of social capital
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Figure 5.1: The impact of social capital and institutions on inter-city variance 
in political participation
on the variation in political participation across cities. Each “column” of the 
figure represents the set of models estimated for each dependent variable. The 
plots represent the percent of between-city variation in the dependent variable 
that remains in each model. While the social capital measures in the models 
presented in the table in this chapter were entered as blocks (social interaction 
variables were entered together and then attitudinal measures were entered), 
the variance components reported in Figure 5.1 are from models where each 
indicator of social capital was entered separately. However modeled, it seems 
that social capital does little, if any, work in accounting for the variation in
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political participation at the level its proponents claim it is operating on—the 
community level.
There axe two concerns here. First, one might argue that social capital at 
the community level is being captured by one or more of the city-level variables 
in the model. In particular, a case could be made that racial diversity is in fact 
a form of social capital, or at least a proxy for it. However, the racial fractional- 
ization index is negatively correlated with the measures of social capital, while 
being positively correlated with political participation. Second, there still re­
mains a degree of between-city variance after controlling for all these variables. 
Insofar as social capital is conceived of as a community-level attribute, it may 
be that it is operating in this remaining variance. This is entirely possible but 
unfortunately there do not exist good data to test this possibility. While an 
unsatisfactory response to the concern, this will remain an important area for 
future research.
5 .5  C o n c l u s i o n
While social capital theorists maintain that face-to-face interaction such as par­
ticipation in voluntary associations, volunteering and the like leads to the cre­
ation of generalized trust, both empirical and theoretical evidence points to 
problems with this argument. Variables of group participation, volunteering 
and informal socializing have relatively little impact on social trust, the latter 
two having significant negative effects. An alternative argument about the im­
portance of life satisfaction provides more powerful predictors of social trust. 
However, the problem of endogeneity remains in that model also. I have argued 
that if social capital is doing any work in explanations of political participa­
tion, it is at the aggregate level; social capital, if it has an effect, should act to
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decrease the inter-city variance in the different indicators of political participa­
tion. However, the analysis of social capital as it is commonly measured and 
operationalized, provides little or no support for this. While social interaction 
does have an effect on individuals’ propensity to participate, and generalized 
trust has an effect on voting, none of these measures reduce the variance be­
tween cities appreciably. The analysis finds scant evidence for the hypothesis 
that social capital operates to affect political participation through attitudes. 
The mobilization hypothesis fares better; but here the concern is that it is 
not adding anything to the understanding of political participation that is not 
already known.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
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6.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
This thesis set out to examine the puzzle of why the political participation of 
otherwise similar individuals varies across communities. Much of the previ­
ous empirical work on political participation—and indeed the major theoretical 
accounts of participation—centers on individual-level characteristics. Past re­
search on political participation has illustrated the importance of individual 
characteristics setting participants apart from non-participants. In particular, 
SES and demographic factors have been shown to be strong predictors of par­
ticipation. People with higher incomes and more education tend to participate 
more. However, even after controlling for these individual-level characteristics, 
there still remains a significant amount of variation in political participation 
between people residing in different communities. So it is not the case that sim­
ilar individuals necessarily participate in the same ways or to the same extent 
regardless of where they live. It is this inter-community variation in political 
participation that is at the core of the thesis.
6 .2  S u m m a r y
Chapter 2 outlined the extent of engagement in the different types of politi­
cal participation. Participation in the contemporary United States was put in 
comparative perspective—with nonpolitical or civic participation, over time and 
cross-nationally. The chapter also explored the socio-demographics of partici­
pation. An individual-level model of political participation was presented and 
the findings indicated there remains a significant amount of variation in the de­
pendent variables across communities even after controlling for individual-level 
factors. That is, similar people do not participate to the same extent in dif­
ferent communities. The thesis examined several aspects of social and political
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context in order to explain this.
In Chapter 3, the racial context of American cities and its effect on partic­
ipation was examined. In contrast to much previous research on the effects of 
racial diversity on civic engagement, social capital and political participation 
which maintains that increased levels of diversity will serve to decrease politi­
cal activity, in thesis I argue the opposite: that people living in more diverse 
communities will be more likely to participate in politics. Inter-racial attitudes 
tend to be more conflictual in more diverse places where race and racial identity 
are more salient. That is, individuals see race relations in terms of a zero-sum 
competition over resources and their distribution. More racially diverse places, 
I argue, should as a result be characterized by more conflict, more issues and 
therefore more political participation. In short, the stakes are higher in more 
diverse cities. I also hypothesized that the effect of individuals’ race on political 
participation varies across cities and this variation can, in part, be explained by 
racial heterogeneity.
The results of the analysis indicate that the effect of racial diversity on 
whites is negative. That is, living in a more racially diverse place tends to lower 
the likelihood that a white individual participates in politics. However, the 
interaction between racial fractionalization and black was positive. For black 
people, living in a more diverse community raises the probability of voting. The 
results from this analysis indicate that the relationship between racial diversity 
and political participation is not straightforward and that it impacts differently 
on people from distinct racial groups. Specifying a model where the individual 
effect of race is allowed to vary randomly across cities uncovers different results 
which remain “hidden” in models where race effects are fixed.
Chapter 4 explored the ways in which the structure and organization of lo­
cal government institutions affects incentives for political participation. As a 
consequence of the reforms introduced in the Progressive Era to combat the
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corruption of machine politics the ways in which government executive struc­
tures are organized and representatives elected varies greatly among American 
cities. Some cities also provide for the direct involvement of citizens in enacting 
legislation through various provisions. The prevailing contention of the liter­
ature is that the institutional reforms brought in during the Progressive Era 
served to dampen participation. However, the findings presented here indicate, 
on the one hand, that individual effects of institutions are more or less nonexis­
tent across the indicators of political participation studied. On the other hand, 
when combined into a measure of city political openness in order to tap polit­
ical opportunity structures, local government institutions do have an effect on 
participation—though these effects are substantively small.
Finally, the thesis tested the social capital theory of political participation. 
While social capital theorists maintain that face-to-face interaction such as par­
ticipation in voluntary associations, volunteering and the like leads to the cre­
ation of generalized trust, both empirical and theoretical evidence points to 
problems with this argument. Variables of group participation, volunteering 
and informal socializing have relatively little impact on social trust, the latter 
two having significantly negative effects. An alternative argument about the 
importance of life satisfaction provides more powerful predictors of social trust. 
I have argued that if social capital is doing any work in explanations of politi­
cal participation, it is at the aggregate level. Social capital, if it has an effect, 
should act to decrease the inter-city variance in the different indicators of po­
litical participation. However, the analysis of social capital as it is commonly 
measured and operationalized, provides little or no support for this. While so­
cial interaction does have an effect on individuals’ propensities to participate, 
and generalized trust has an effect on voting, none of these measures reduce the 
variance between cities appreciably. The analysis finds scant evidence for the 
hypothesis that social capital operates to affect political participation through
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attitudes. The mobilization hypothesis fares better; but here the concern is that 
it is not adding anything to the understanding of political participation that is 
not already known.
6 .3  F u t u r e  R e s e a r c h
I have argued that in order to gain a better understanding of political participa­
tion, it is necessary to look at both individual and contextual data together. Of 
course there are many aspects of context that have not been addressed in this 
thesis but that nevertheless are important to consider in future research. Among 
theses are various forms other forms of community heterogeneity. For instance, 
the effects of income spread and ideological heterogeneity—or polarization— 
both deserve more attention. As mentioned in previous chapters, the fact that 
voting data from local elections in the United States is very hard to come by and 
often unreliable, presents a problem for this kind of research. Collecting these 
data would represent a considerable asset to the study of political behavior in 
the local context. Finally, if one is interested in how local political institutions 
affect political participation, it would be very useful to study instances where 
institutions have changed. These kinds of natural experiments could prove a 
particularly fruitful avenue of future research.
6 .4  I m p l i c a t i o n s
This thesis contributes to our understanding of political participation in several 
ways. First, while comparative work on political participation is not new, the 
majority of extant studies make comparisons across countries. By comparing
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across a large set of communities within one country, I am able to avoid many 
of the difficulties associated with such cross-national studies—for example, hav­
ing to account for political culture and other elusive concepts. Participation in 
local politics is also of substantive importance in that many of the most con­
tentious issues in American politics are fought in the local arena. Second, by 
using multilevel modeling techniques, the dissertation makes a methodological 
contribution. Multilevel modeling is well suited to a number of political science 
problems but it remains an underused technique.
The underlying motivation of this thesis has been the need for attentiveness 
to the dynamics at work between individual behavior and sources of variation 
in incentives at higher levels—that is, the interplay between individual charac­
teristics and the social and political environment in which individuals operate. 
The findings illustrate not only how political context effects individual behavior 
but also how, and under what circumstances, individual-level attributes interact 
with environmental factors. In this way, I am able to offer explanations of how 
political and social context structures incentives in ways leading to different be­
havior for similar people. Focusing solely on individuals’ interest in politics and 
political resources is insufficient as these are subject to the influence of variation 
in institutions.
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Appendix A
The Social Capital Com m unity  
Benchmark Survey
A . l  S a m p l i n g  M e t h o d s ,  S e l e c t i o n  I s s u e s  a n d
R e s p o n s e  R a t e s
The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey consists of two parts. The 
first, a national sample of 3003 individuals from across the United States; the 
second, fortyone socalled “community samples” comprising a further 26,730 
individuals. The survey was conducted by telephone using random-digit-dialing 
(RDD) during July—November, 2000 except for the West Oakland, California 
survey (which ran from December, 2000—February, 2001). Interviewing in the 
national survey and in most of the community surveys was concluded in October. 
Interviews averaged 26 minutes in length.1
A. 1.1 L o c a l  S a m p l e  D e s ig n
Each sponsoring organization decided what specific area(s) were to be surveyed, 
how many interviews to conduct, and if specific areas or ethnic groups were to 
be oversampled. Most of the community surveys used proportionate sampling, 
that is, no over or undersampling of subareas or population groups. Most of
1These descriptions of sampling, selection and interview methods are taken from 
the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey Technical Documentation, available at 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/misc/usmisc2000-soccap/usmisc2000-soccap.pdf.
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the samples range in size from 500—1,500 interviews. (A complete list of com­
munities surveyed along with each surveys sponsor, sample size and geographic 
definition are shown in Table A .l below.)
A. 1 .2  N a t io n a l  S u r v e y
The national sample contains an oversampling of black and Hispanic respon­
dents to total at least 500 blacks and 500 Hispanics in all. This required screen­
ing to identify households with black or Hispanic residents: Several hundred 
additional blacks (288) and (294) Hispanics had to be identified and interviewed 
beyond the interviews with blacks/Hispanics occurring naturally in the national 
survey. This screening was conducted randomly across the Continental US; ar­
eas of higher concentration were not targeted in this design.
Table A .l contains the maximum confidence interval by community for per­
centage estimates, given the sampling design implemented in each survey:
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Table A.l: Effective Sample Sizes and 95% Confidence Intervals for Percentage 
Estimates0
Final
Sample
Statistical
Efficiency
Effective 
Sample Size
95% Cl 
(±)
Atlanta Metro (GA) 510 0.802 409 4.8%
Baton Rouge (LA) 500 0.820 410 4.8%
Birmingham Metro (AL) 500 0.780 390 5.0%
Bismarck (ND) 506 0.835 422 4.8%
Boston (MA) [city] 604 0.473 285 5.8%
Boulder County (CO) 500 0.802 401 4.9%
Central Oregon 500 0.801 400 4.9%
Charlotte (NC) [14-county region] 1500 0.800 1200 2.8%
Chicago Metro (IL) 750 0.766 574 4.1%
Cincinnati Metro (OH) 1001 0.796 796 3.5%
Cleveland/Cuyahoga Co. (OH) 1100 0.687 755 3.6%
Delaware 1383 0.570 788 3.5%
Denver (CO) (city/cty.) 501 0.762 381 5.0%
Detroit (MI) [Metro-7 co. area ] 501 0.766 383 5.0%
East Tennessee 500 0.805 402 4.9%
Fremont/Newaygo Co. (MI) 753 0.750 564 4.1%
Grand Rapids (MI) [city] 502 0.737 369 5.1%
Greensboro/Guilford Co. (NC) 752 0.789 593 4.0%
Houston/Harris Co. (TX) 500 0.841 420 4.8%
Indiana 1001 0.673 673 3.8%
Kalamazoo Co. (MI) 500 0.801 400 4.9%
Kanawha Valley (WV) 500 0.731 365 5.1%
Lewiston-Auburn (ME) 523 0.804 420 4.8%
Los Angeles Co. (CA) 515 0.733 377 5.0%
Minneapolis (MN) 501 0.688 344 5.3%
Montana 502 0.795 399 4.9%
New Hampshire 711 0.638 453 4.6%
North Minneapolis (MN) 452 0.732 330 5.4%
Peninsula/Silicon Valley (CA) 1505 0.717 1079 3.0%
Phoenix/Maricopa Cty. (AZ) 501 0.698 349 5.2%
Rochester Metro (NY) 988 0.744 735 3.6%
San Diego Co. (CA) 504 0.578 291 5.7%
San Francisco (CA) [city] 500 0.641 320 5.5%
South Dakota (rural) 368 0.769 282 5.8%
Seattle (WA) 502 0.566 284 5.8%
St. Paul Metro (MN) 503 0.740 372 5.1%
Syracuse/Onondaga Co. (NY) 541 0.797 431 4.7%
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Co. (NC) 750 0.778 583 4.1%
Yakima (WA) 500 0.807 403 4.9%
York (PA) 500 0.808 404 4.9%
National sample 3003 0.687 2063 2.1%
° For estimates near 50%; estimates farther from 50% will have narrower confidence ranges
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A. 1.3 RDD S a m p l e  S o u r c e  a n d  S a m p l in g  o f  H o u s e h o l d s
The Genesys™ system, a widely-recognized random-digit-dial survey telephone 
number generator, was used to produce the starting sample telephone numbers. 
Genesys is a list-assisted sampling procedure which generates numbers from 
all working residential hundred-banks (area code +  exchange +  digits 7 and 
8; example: 215 654-78XX) of possible telephone numbers corresponding to 
the targeted geographic area the boundaries of the communitys geography, 
as specified by the sponsor. A hundred-bank is determined to be “working 
residential” if it contained at least one two directory-listed residential phone 
numbers.
As in all RDD telephone surveys, prefixes (area code -1- exchange combi­
nations, sometimes called 10,000-banks) were selected which correspond to the 
area being surveyed. The degree of correspondence is not perfect and depends, 
among other factors, on the size of the geographic unit being surveyed: the 
larger the area, the more likely that a phone number from a given prefix will 
fall within the indicated borders. Correspondence is very high with state lines, 
fairly high with large county boundaries, less so with smaller counties, and so 
forth. The same sizedegree of fit relationship applies among municipalities. 
Irregularly shaped borders can also complicate (lessen) the tightness of the cor­
respondence.
Most sponsors were willing to accept some degree of slippage between sam­
ple phone exchanges and desired geography—and tolerate an expected small 
percentage of their final sample falling outside the geographic definition of their 
community—rather than implement more expensive respondent screening. In 
a few cases, screening was agreed upon to try to confirm that the respondent 
resides within the desired area (see Table A.2).2 These were generally surveys 
where the correspondence was low.
2A lthough more accurate than  m erely assum ing and not asking, respondents answers are 
not always correct about location o f  residence.
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A. 1 .4  D i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  S t r a t if ic a t i o n  in  S o m e  C o m m u n i t y  S u r v e y s
Except in the few community surveys where there was oversampling, propor­
tionate random sampling was used to select households. Table A.2 lists the 
samples which involved oversampling and/or screening:
Table A.2: Surveys with Disproportionate Sampling or Screening
Survey Description
National 
City of Boston
Delaware
Greater Greensboro NC 
(Guilford County)
Cuyahoga County OH 
Metropolitan Rochester NY
Newaygo County MI 
North Minneapolis MN
Screening to achieve minimum sub-samples of 
500 African-Americans and 500 Hispanics. 
Screening in 4 targeted zip codes of lower 
income population to produce 200 additional 
respondents in those areas.
New Castle County under-sampled; Kent and 
Sussex counties oversampled. Screening in 
targeted exchanges in New Castle County to 
achieve a total of 342 interviews with 
Wilmington residents. (Note: Fewer 
Wilmington respondents were actually 
interviewed (146) due to respondents 
misidentifying city of residence. The rest 
were re-classified as living in the balance of 
New Castle County.)
Oversampling in targeted exchanges to 
produce an additional 250 interviews with 
residents in exchanges that service, at least in 
part, the city of Greensboro.
Screening in targeted exchanges to produce 
an additional 100 interviews with Hispanics. 
Screening in targeted exchanges to achieve a 
minimum total subsample of 100 
African-Americans and 100 Hispanics. 
Screening used to confirm that respondents 
reside in Newaygo County.
Screening used to identify eligible 
respondents (residing in zip codes 55411 or 
55405 and north of 1-394).
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A. 1.5 S e l e c t io n  o f  R e s p o n d e n t s
The “last-birthday” method of respondent selection was used to randomly select 
one adult in contacted households:
So that all types of people are represented in our survey, may I please 
speak to the person 18 years or older living in your household who 
last had a birthday?
Substitution of alternate respondents was not permitted: If the designated re­
spondent was unwilling or unavailable to be interviewed throughout the full 
complement of contact attempts, that phone number was assigned the appro­
priate non-response code.
A. 1.6 C o n t a c t  R e g im e n
To minimize the number of non-contacts, at least 11 attempts were made (initial 
dialing plus 10 call-backs) before sampled telephone numbers were replaced. In 
many cases particularly when re-contact appointments were made and eventual 
contact seemed likely there were more than 11 dialings to sampled numbers. 
Successive contact attempts were scheduled at different times of the day and 
week, and the full complement typically spanned a period of at least one month, 
often longer, to maximize the chance of eventual contact.
To minimize the number of refusals and increase participation, skilled “re­
fusal conversion” interviewers attempted to re-contact those initially opting out 
of the survey (or hanging up abruptly) and persuade the designated respondent 
in the household to agree to be interviewed. Such efforts did not include “hard 
refusals”-where the person answering was decidedly adamant about not partic­
ipating, or was angry or abusive to the interviewer. Altogether 3,687 interviews 
(= 12.6% of 29,238 interviews in all3) occurred after a callback where someone
3This count does not include interviews in the Hawaii or West Oakland, California surveys.
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in the household had explicitly refused once or hung up the phone two or more 
times on earlier calls.
A. 1 .7  R e s p o n s e  R a t e s
Survey response rates are shown in Table A.3. The first column (Response 
Rate) displays the overall response rate, unadjusted for incidence of eligibility:
R R  = I  / ( ( /  + R  + N C  + O + e(UH)),
where: I  — the number of completed interviews; R  — the number of refusals 
and terminations; N C  = the number of households where the designated respon­
dent was not reached (and there was no explicit refusal); O = other (health or 
language barriers); UH = unknown eligibility /  unknown if household-mostly 
repeated busy signal or Caller ID block.
The proportion of unknowns estimated to be eligible (e) was .25. In most 
samples, there was no geographic or race/ethnicity screening, so all adults qual­
ified (incidence =  100%). For those samples, the Response Rate and Adjusted 
Response Rate are the same. In the community surveys where screening oc­
curred (as in the national survey), incidence was less than 100%—requiring an 
adjustment to make the screened and unscreened sample response rates com­
parable. The adjustment consisted of multiplying the sum of the non-response 
categories in the denominator of the formula [R, NC,  O, e(UH)] by the esti­
mated incidence4 and recalculating RR.
The incidence proportion was calculated as the sum of (the completed in­
terviews plus partial interviews5 plus terminates) divided by the sum of (the
The Hawaii interviews were conducted by another interviewing firm; the West Oakland surveys 
were completed too late to be included in the technical report.
4This adjustment assumes that the likelihood of contact and cooperation following contact 
was the same among eligible and ineligible respondents. This assumption may be less valid 
in some samples/locations than in others. To the extent it does not apply, the estimated 
adjusted rate will be inaccurate.
5In this survey, “partial interviews” are those which were begun but not completed and
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completed interviews plus partial interviews plus terminates plus the number of 
households screened and determined to be ineligible).
The Adjusted Cooperation Rate uses the same logic as the Adjusted Re­
sponse Rate—only it deletes the NC,  O, and e(UH)  terms from the denomi­
nator. Essentially, it the number of eligible respondents reached who chose to 
participate and completed an interview. The Cooperation Rate (or Adjusted 
Cooperation Rate) is the inverse of the Refusal Rate: Coop Rate =  1 - Refusal 
Rate.
there was no explicit refusal to continue. They are not included in the dataset.
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Table A.3: Survey Response Rates
Response 
Rate (%)
Incidence of 
Eligibility0
Adj Response 
Rate (%)b
Adj Coop 
Rate (%)c
Atlanta Metro (GA) 29.8 1.000 29.8 42.9
Baton Rouge (LA) 25.0 1.000 25.0 36.2
Birmingham Metro (AL) 31.6 1.000 31.6 41.6
Bismarck (ND) 39.7 1.000 39.7 46.0
Boston (MA) [city] 28.5 1.000 28.5 42.3
Boulder County (CO) 22.4 1.000 22.4 35.3
Central Oregon 34.1 1.000 34.1 44.2
Charlotte (NC) 25.0 1.000 25.0 37.1
Chicago Metro (IL) 25.6 1.000 25.6 36.9
Cincinnati Metro (OH) 38.7 1.000 38.7 49.5
Cleveland/Cuyahoga Co (OH) 20.0 0.649 27.9 40.1
Delaware 27.3 0.984 27.6 40.6
Denver (CO) (city/cty) 14.9 1.000 14.9 30.2
Detroit (MI) 30.1 1.000 30.1 40.8
East Tennessee 26.2 1.000 26.2 35.4
Fremont/Newaygo Co (MI) 40.0 1.000 45.1 57.2
Grand Rapids (MI) [city] 36.0 1.000 36.0 50.3
Greensboro/Guilford Co (NC) 32.7 1.000 32.7 43.8
Houston/Harris Co (TX) 28.7 1.000 28.7 41.2
Indiana 26.7 1.000 26.7 37.2
Kalamazoo Co (MI) 27.1 1.000 27.1 40.9
Kanawha Valley (WV) 27.4 1.000 27.4 44.0
Lewiston-Auburn (ME) 26.8 1.000 26.8 38.9
Los Angeles Co (CA) 24.1 1.000 24.1 39.1
Minneapolis (MN) 39.6 1.000 39.6 53.9
Montana 44.1 1.000 44.1 55.4
New Hampshire 32.2 1.000 32.3 41.2
North Minneapolis (MN) 16.3 0.382 33.8 47.5
Peninsula/Silicon Valley (CA) 20.3 1.000 20.3 34.2
Phoenix/Maricopa Co (AZ) 31.7 1.000 31.7 43.3
Rochester Metro (NY) 27.1 0.721 34.0 42.9
San Diego Co (CA) 30.9 1.000 30.9 43.6
San Francisco (CA) [city] 27.1 1.000 27.1 45.8
South Dakota (rural) 35.2 1.000 35.2 42.5
Seattle (WA) 25.1 1.000 25.1 43.9
St Paul Metro (MN) 39.2 1.000 39.2 48.6
Syracuse/Onondaga Co (NY) 24.8 1.000 24.8 35.2
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Co (NC) 34.8 1.000 34.8 47.7
Yakima (WA) 34.6 1.000 34.6 47.9
York (PA) 28.2 1.000 28.2 38.8
TOTAL: COMMUNITIES 27.4 0.929 28.9 41.6
NATIONAL SAMPLE 17.2 0.519 28.7 42.3
° Proportion qualifying as eligible for survey 
 ^Response rate adjusted for incidence of eligibility
c Percent of those estimated as eligible who agreed to participate and complete interview
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A.2 W e ig h t in g  t h e  I n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  D a t a
The data weighting involved three steps: (1) calculation of an initial weight, (2) 
calculation of the balancing weight, and (3) multiplying these two weights to 
produce the final weight.
A . 2 .1  I n it ia l  W e ig h t
The initial weight takes account of (a) the number of adults in the household 
and (b) the number of telephone lines in the household through which someone 
could be contacted. Calculation of the initial weight is straightforward:
Initial weight =  number of household adults /  number of phone lines.
Example: If there were 3 adults and 2 phone numbers, the initial weight would 
be 1.5. (The number of adults entered into the formula was capped at 3 to 
avoid excessive variance. The number of phones was capped at 2.)
For those samples with geographic disproportionality—where specifications 
called for different proportions of interviews with residents in different parts of 
the sample area relative to population size—a further adjustment was made to 
the initial weight. For example, if residents in the center city made up 25% of 
the population of the county of which it is a part, but had 50% of the interviews, 
then each center city respondent’s initial weight would be halved and each non 
center city respondent’s weight would be increased by 50% (.75/.50 =  1.5).
A . 2 .2  B a l a n c i n g  W e ig h t
The purpose of the balancing weight is to reproduce the population distributions 
in the sample on four demographic characteristics: gender, age, education and 
race/ethnicity. The best available population estimates were used as the target 
proportions for calculating the balancing weights—either U.S. Census (CPS)
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figures (in a minority of samples) or MSG estimates, from Marketing Systems 
Group, which provided the Genesys™ RDD sample.
Except for one community sample (state of Indiana) and the national sam­
ple, weighting calculations are based on the marginal frequency distributions of 
the four balancing weight variables. For Indiana, reliable cell-based population 
estimates were available and used as the basis for the balancing weight. In all 
of the other samples, univariate distributions ( “marginals”) for each of the four 
demographics (gender, age, education and race) were used. These were entered 
into a program which uses an iterative process to estimate cell weights—a pro­
cedure known as “marginal weighting” or “raking.” The algorithm attempts 
to reproduce the marginal distributions as closely as possible while minimizing 
variation across the cell weights.
For the balancing weight variables, the categories used in most of the sam­
ples were: gender: male, female; age: 18-34, 35-44, 45-64, 65+; education: col­
lege graduate, not college graduate; and race/ethnicity: Hispanic, non-Hispanic 
black, all others. When available, additional categories were sometimes used for 
education and race/ethnicity to afford greater precision. Additional categories 
were employed in the weighting only when they constituted at least 5% of the 
respective survey’s estimated population and the sample cell was nonempty.
A .3 T h e  S o c ia l  C a p it a l  C o m m u n it y  B e n c h m a r k
S u r v e y  C o m p a r e d
In order to check on issues of selection bias, I have compared the Social Capital 
Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) to two other national samples from 
the United States; the 2000 American National Election Study (ANES) and 
the 1990 Citizen Participation Study (CPS). Frequencies for key variables are 
presented in Table A.4. It should be noted that the ANES was specifically de­
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signed to capture opinion and behavior around the 2000 Presidential election 
and therefore questions about nonelectoral behavior are focused on that par­
ticular campaign rather than politics in general. Similarly, the the fact that 
the CPS was conducted ten years prior to the SCCBS might result in some 
differences. While there are differences in sampling and, to some extent, the 
purpose of these surveys, there nevertheless exists a relatively strong overlap in 
respondents’ answers to questions in the three studies giving me a good level 
of confidence that responses to the SCCBS are not affected by any marked 
selection bias.
Table A.4: A comparison of national surveys®
Variable SCCBS (2000) ANES (2000) CPS (1990)
Turnout 76 73 63
Political meeting 18 56 18
Political group 10 n/a 7
Demonstration 8 n/a 11
Trust national government® 30 44 n/a
Income <$30K 28 26d 26
Income >$100K 11 l l e 9
High school 26 27 40
University degree/postgrad 27 24 14
Female 59 56 53
White 72 74 64
Black 13 13 19
Asian 3 3 1
Hispanic 12 7 14
Mean age (years) 43 47 57
N 29,732 1544 2,517
a Cell entries are percentages unless otherwise stated.
 ^The ANES item asks specifically about meetings in support of election candidates.
0 Percentage of respondents who trust the national government “most of the time” or 
“just about always”.
d For the ANES, this category is <$24,999.
e For the ANES, this category is >$94,999
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A .4  Q u e s t io n  W o r d i n g s  a n d  C o d in g s
(Note: “Refused” or “Don’t know” responses were coded as missing for all questions.)
Female: gender of respondent; coded 1 Female, 0 Male.
Q6 Trust Now, I want to ask you some questions about how you view other people. 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people?
1 People can be trusted recoded as 2
2 You can’t be too careful recoded as 0
3 (VOLUNTEERED) Depends recoded as 1
8 Don’t Know
9 Refused
Q7 Social trust groups Next, we’d like to know how much you trust different 
groups of people. First, think about (GROUP). Generally speaking, would you say 
that you can trust them a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?
Q7A TRNEI People in your neighborhood (CLARIFY IF NECESSARY: 
How about in general?)
Q7B TRWRK People you work with
Q7C TRREL People at your church or place of worship
Q7D TRSHP People who work in the stores where you shop
Q7E TRMEDIA The local news media
Q7F TRCOP The police in your local community
Q7G TRWHT White people
Q7H TRBLK African Americans or Blacks?
Q7I TRASN Asian people?
Q7J TRHISP Hispanics or Latinos?
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All items coded:
1 Trust them a lot recoded as 3
2 Trust them some recoded as 2
3 Trust them only a little recoded as 1
4 Trust them not at all recoded as 0
5 (VOLUNTEERED) Does not apply recoded as missing
8 Don’t Know
9 Refused
Q9 HAPPY All things considered, would you say you are very happy, happy, not 
very happy, or not happy at all?
8 Don’t Know
9 Refused
Q12 LIVCOM Number of years lived in your local community
1 Less than one year
2 One to five years
3 Six to ten years
4 Eleven to twenty years
5 More than twenty years
6 All my life
Q15 OWN Do you or your family own the place where you are living now, or do 
you rent?
0 Rent
1 Very happy
2 Happy
3 Not very Happy
4 Not happy at all
recoded as 3
recoded as 2
recoded as 1
recoded as 0
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1 Own
Q23 VOTEUS As you may know, around half the public does not vote in 
presidential elections. How about you-did you vote in the presidential election in 
1996 when Bill Clinton ran against Bob Dole and Ross Perot, or did you skip that 
one? (DO NOT PROBE DK RESPONSE)
1 Yes, Voted
2 No, Skipped that one recoded as 0
3 (VOLUNTEERED) Was not eligible recoded as missing
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
Q24 TGNAT How much of the time do you think you can trust the NATIONAL 
government to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, only some of 
the time, or hardly ever?
1 Just about always recoded as 3
2 Most of the time recoded as 2
3 Some of the time recoded as 1
4 Hardly ever recoded as 0
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
Q25 TGLOC How about your LOCAL government? How much of the time do you 
think you can trust the LOCAL government to do what is right? (Would you say 
just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or hardly ever?)
1 Just about always recoded as 3
2 Most of the time recoded as 2
3 Some of the time recoded as 1
4 Hardly ever recoded as 0
8 Don’t know
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9 Refused
Q26 Which of the following things have you done in the past twelve months:
Q26A PETITION Have you signed a petition?
Q26B RALLY Attended a political meeting or rally?
Q26C PROJECT Worked on a community project?
Q26D MARCH Participated in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or 
marches?
All items coded:
1 Yes
2 No recoded as 0
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
Q30 RELMEM Are you a MEMBER of a local church, synagogue, or other 
religious or spiritual community?
1 Yes
2 No recoded as 0
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
Q31 RELATEND Not including weddings and funerals, how often do you attend 
religious services? (IF NECESSARY PROBE WITH CATEGORIES)
1 Every week (or more often)
2 Almost every week
3 Once or twice a month
4 A few times per year
5 Less often than that
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
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Q32 RELPART1 In the past 12 months, have you taken part in any sort of activity 
with people at your church or place of worship other than attending services? This 
might include teaching Sunday school, serving on a committee, attending choir 
rehearsal, retreat, or other things.
1 Yes
2 No recoded as 0
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
Q33 Group involvements Now I’d like to ask about other kinds of groups and 
organizations. I’m going to read a list; just answer YES if you have been involved in 
the past 12 months with this kind of group.
Q33A GRPERL Besides your local place of worship,) Any organization affiliated 
with religion, such as the Knights of Columbus or B’nai B’rith (BA-NAY BRITH), 
or a bible study group?
Q33B GRPSPORT (How about) An adult sports club or league, or an outdoor 
activity club.
Q33C GRP YOUTH (How about) A youth organization like youth sports leagues, 
the scouts, 4-H clubs, and Boys Sz Girls Clubs.
Q33D GRPPTA A parents’ association, like the PTA or PTO, or other school 
support or service groups.
Q33E GRPVET A veteran’s group.
Q33F GRPNEI A neighborhood association, like a block association, a homeowner 
or tenant association, or a crime watch group.
Q33G GRPELD Clubs or organizations for senior citizens or older people.
Q33H GRPSOC A charity or social welfare organization that provides services in 
such fields as health or service to the needy.
Q33I GRPLAB A labor union.
Q33J GRPPROF A professional, trade, farm, or business association.
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Q33K GRPFRAT Service clubs or fraternal organizations such as the Lions or 
Kiwanis or a local women’s club or a college fraternity or sorority. (NOTE: Includes 
Alumni Organizations)
Q33L GRPETH Ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organizations, such as the 
National Organization for Women, the Mexican American Legal Defense or the 
NAACP?
Q33M GRPPOL Other public interest groups, political action groups, political 
clubs, or party committees.
Q33N GRPART A literary, art, discussion or study group or a musical, dancing, 
or singing group.
Q330 GRPHOB Any other hobby, investment, or garden clubs or societies.
Q33P GRPSELF A support group or self-help program for people with specific 
illnesses, disabilities, problems, or addictions, or for their families.
Q33Q GRP WWW Are you involved in any group that meets only over the 
Internet.
Q33R GRPOTHER And do you belong to any other kinds of clubs or organiza­
tions?
All items coded:
1 Yes
2 No recoded as 0
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
The social trust (SOCTRUST) index was constructed from responses to questions 
Q6, 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 7f (general interpersonal trust, trust neighbors, trust co-workers, 
trust fellow congregants, trust store employees where you shop, trust local police). 
The index is calculated as the mean of the standardized responses to the 5 questions, 
using national norms to standardize.
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Diversity of friendships (DIVRSITY)—this index is a count of how many different 
kinds of personal friends the respondent has from the 11 possible types in the Q55 
series.
Number of formal group involvements (GRPINVLV)—counts of “yes” answers in 
the 18-item Q33 series.
Informal social interactions (SCHMOOZ)—based in responses to Q56F, 56D, 56D, 
561, and 56C (having friends visit home, visiting with relatives, socializing with 
co-workers outside of work, hanging out with friends in public places, playing cards 
and board games). The index is calculated as the mean of the standardized responses 
to the 5 questions, based on national survey norms.
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Appendix B
The International C ity/C ounty  
M anagement A ssociation (ICM A) 1991 
M unicipal Form of Government Survey
B . l  Q u e s t io n  W o r d in g s  a n d  C o d in g s
(Note: “Refused” or “Don’t know” or “Not sure” responses were coded as missing 
for all questions.)
Q1 Form of Government Indicate your current form of government as defined by 
your charter, ordinance, or state law. (Check only one.)
1 Mayor-Council recoded as .5
2 Council-Manager recoded as 0
3 Commission recoded as .25
4 Town Meeting recoded as 1
5 Representative Town Meeting recoded as .75
6 Not sure
Q7 Direct Democracy Does your municipality have provision for any of the 
following? (Check all applicable.)
Q7.1 Initiative 
Q7.2 Referendum 
Q7.3 Recall
Q7.4 Petition or Protest Referendum
All items coded:
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0 No
1 Yes
Q21 NONPART Does the political party affiliation of candidates for board or 
council appear on the ballot in a local general election?
0 Yes
1 No
Q29 COUNSELEC Indicate the number of council members selected by each of 
the following methods.
Q29.1 Nominated and elected at large 
Q29.2 Nominated by ward or district and elected at large 
Q29.3 Nominated by ward or district elected by ward or district 
Q29.4 Other (specify)
Q29.a CSIZE Total council members listed in 1-4.
ATLRGE The percentage of the total council members elected at large (Q29.1 and 
Q29.2).
ELECFORM
0 More than 50% of council elected at large 
.5 50% of council elected at large
1 Less than 50% of council elected at large
City political system openness (OPENNESS) is an index constructed from the fol­
lowing items: Ql; Q7; Q21; ELECFORM. Scores from each of these items were 
summed to create the index.
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Appendix C
Descriptive Statistics
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Table C.l: Level 1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable name N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
Voting 14017 0.70 0.46 0 1
Petition 14017 0.42 0.49 0 1
Political meeting 14017 0.20 0.40 0 1
Demonstration/boycott 14017 0.10 0.30 0 1
Political group 14017 0.11 0.32 0 1
Independent variables
Happy 14017 2.28 0.60 0 3
Years in community 14017 3.43 1.48 0 6
Home owner 14017 0.58 0.49 0 1
Economic satisfaction 14017 1.07 0.65 0 2
Volunteering 14017 8.43 14.75 0 53
Group involvement 14017 3.20 2.78 0 18
Trust 14017 1.01 0.96 0 2
Social trust 14017 0.09 0.54 -2.32 1.04
Schmoozing 14017 -0.02 0.65 -0.88 4.73
Diversity of friends 14017 6.48 2.71 0 11
Under $20K 14017 0.16 0.36 0 1
$20-29,000 14017 0.14 0.35 0 1
$30-49,999 14017 0.24 0.42 0 1
$50-74,999 14017 0.18 0.38 0 1
$75-99,999 14017 0.10 0.31 0 1
Over $100K 14017 0.12 0.32 0 1
High School 14017 0.29 0.46 0 1
Some College 14017 0.32 0.47 0 1
Bachelors 14017 0.19 0.39 0 1
Graduate School 14017 0.20 0.40 0 1
Married 14017 0.57 0.49 0 1
Gender 14017 0.59 0.49 0 1
Age 14017 43.25 16.69 16 97
White 14017 0.61 0.49 0 1
Black 14017 0.18 0.38 0 1
Asian 14017 0.05 0.22 0 1
Hispanic 14017 0.16 0.37 0 1
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ITable C.2: Level 2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable name N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Form of government 1139 0.22 0.25 0 1
Initiative 1139 0.46 0.50 0 1
Referendum 1139 0.73 0.45 0 1
Recall 1139 0.51 0.50 0 1
Petition referendum 1139 0.29 0.45 0 1
Nonpartisan 1139 0.24 0.43 0 1
Council size 1139 6.85 3.21 3 51
Population 1139 76326 306704 2505 8008278
Percent at-large 1139 0.63 0.44 0 1
Electoral form 1139 0.41 0.49 0 1
Direct democracy 1139 1.99 1.46 0 4
Openness 1139 0.41 0.22 0.00 0.93
Percent White 1139 0.77 0.19 0.04 0.99
Percent Black 1139 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.93
Percent Asian 1139 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.62
Percent Hispanic 1139 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.58
Racial fractionalization 1139 0.31 0.20 0.01 0.76
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Supplem entary Tables
S u p p l e m e n t a r y  T a b l e s  F r o m  C h a p t e r  5
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Table D.l: The impact of formal and informal 
interaction on social trusta
Variable: Estimate
Fixed effects 
Constant 0.114***
Black6
(0.007)
-0.308***
Asian
(0.015)
-0.128***
Hispanic
(0.022)
-0.267***
Age
(0.014)
0.007***
Age2
(0.002)
-0.000***
Under $20KC
(0.000)
-0.110***
$20-29,000
(0.016)
-0.055***
$30-49,999
(0.016)
-0.017
$50-74,999
(0.011)
0.006
$75-99,999
(0.011)
0.016
High school4
(0.014)
-0.132***
Some college
(0.014)
-0.062***
Bachelors
(0.012)
-0.013
Female
(0.011)
0.053***
Married
(0.011)
0.026***
Face-to-face interaction  
Group involvement
(0.009)
0.002
Volunteering
(0.002)
0.001**
Schmoozing
(0.000)
0.022***
Diversity of friendships
(0.008)
0.015***
Random Effects 
City-level variance ( t o o )
(0.002)
0.066***
Individual-level variance (cr2) 0.481
a N=14,017; J=634. Dependent variable is the social 
trust index; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Estimates are OLS coefficients; 
robust standard errors in parentheses.
 ^Excluded category for race is “white”.
c Excluded category for income is “Over 100K”.
 ^Excluded category for education is “graduate school”.
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Table D.2: Face-to-face interaction, group membership and political
participation0
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Dem o/boycott Pol. group
Fixed Effects 
Constant 1.486*** -0.539*** -1.817*** -2.856*** -2.911***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.076) (0.068)
Black6 0.025 -0.434*** 0.188* -0.039 -0.467***
(0.055) (0.064) (0.088) (0.098) (0.090)
Asian -1.082*** -0.866*** -0.096 -0.253* -0.542***
(0.130) (0.105) (0.146) (0.151) (0.188)
Hispanic -0.583*** -0.547*** 0.051 0.175 -0.263**
(0.090) (0.076) (0.097) (0.110) (0.116)
Age 0.096*** 0.049*** -0.001 -0.007 -0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.001*** - 0.000 -0.000* - 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Under $20KC -0.444*** -0.215*** -0.040 0.396** -0.098
(0.125) (0.072) (0.118) (0.170) (0.153)
$20-29,000 -0.333*** -0.158* -0.031 0.412*** -0.078
(0.113) (0.083) (0.114) (0.134) (0.168)
$30-49,999 -0.019 0.007 -0.154 0.280** -0.099
(0.091) (0.073) (0.094) (0.128) (0.102)
$50-74,999 0.058 0.093 -0.105 0.330** -0.139
(0.107) (0.079) (0.086) (0.135) (0.097)
$75-99,999 0.142 0.133 0.039 0.239* -0.012
(0.111) (0.082) (0.089) (0.130) (0.126)
High school** -1.540*** -0.608*** -0.638*** -0.308** -0.983***
(0.091) (0.085) (0.086) (0.152) (0.144)
Some college -0.733*** -0.119* -0.226*** -0.195* -0.402***
(0.095) (0.065) (0.072) (0.118) (0.102)
Bachelors -0.055 -0.074 -0.118 -0.137 -0.213**
(0.115) (0.075) (0.078) (0.139) (0.097)
Female 0.239*** 0.167*** -0.172*** 0.040 -0.372***
(0.054) (0.047) (0.055) (0.074) (0.077)
Married 0.106* -0.028 -0.127* -0.156* -0.205**
(0.056) (0.046) (0.065) (0.085) (0.079)
Face-to-face interaction 
Group involvement 0.137*** 0.197*** 0.279*** 0.249*** 0.448***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.090)
Schmoozing -0.062 0.125*** 0.126** 0.048 -0.067
(0.050) (0.031) (0.048) (0.071) (0.062)
Diversity of friendships 0.061*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.131*** 0.051***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Random Effects 
City-level Variance ( t o o ) 0.232 0.412*** 0.299*** 0.427*** 0.268***
Intraclass correlation (p ) 0.066 0.111 0.083 0.115 0.075
-2 x Log Likelihood 34962.167 41923.137 37396.546 33568.032 33003.514
° N=13,998; J=633. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
 ^Excluded category for race is “white” .
c Excluded category for income is “over $100K”.
 ^Excluded category for education is “graduate school”.
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Table D.3: Face-to-face interaction, group membership, generalized trust and 
political participation0
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Dem o/boycott Pol. group
Fixed Effects 
Constant 1.483*** -0.541*** -1.814*** -2.852*** -2.909***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.077) (0.068)
Black6 0.108* -0.384*** 0.137 -0.129 -0.551***
(0.057) (0.068) (0.089) (0.105) (0.093)
Asian -1.048*** -0.778*** -0.120 -0.290* -0.583***
(0.133) (0.104) (0.147) (0.154) (0.190)
Hispanic -0.519*** -0.533*** 0.011 0.106 -0.324***
(0.091) (0.079) (0.098) (0.126) (0.120)
Age 0.095*** 0.037*** - 0.000 -0.005 -0.007
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** - 0.000 -0.000* - 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Under $20KC -0.419*** -0.130 -0.061 0.357** -0.133
(0.124) (0.080) (0.117) (0.169) (0.155)
$20-29,000 -0.320*** -0.098 -0.043 0.385*** -0.104
(0.114) (0.088) (0.114) (0.135) (0.167)
$30-49,999 -0.015 0.030 -0.159* 0.272** -0.109
(0.092) (0.077) (0.094) (0.128) (0.101)
$50-74,999 0.059 0.111 -0.104 0.329** -0.139
(0.107) (0.082) (0.086) (0.135) (0.097)
$75-99,999 0.138 0.138 0.040 0.240* -0.012
(0.110) (0.085) (0.089) (0.131) (0.127)
High school** -1.514*** -0.539*** -0.660*** -0.355** -1.022***
(0.094) (0.088) (0.088) (0.150) (0.144)
Some college -0.720*** -0.123* -0.236*** -0.215* -0.420***
(0.095) (0.067) (0.073) (0.118) (0.102)
Bachelors -0.060 -0.075 -0.117 -0.137 -0.212**
(0.116) (0.076) (0.079) (0.140) (0.099)
Female 0.227*** 0.164*** -0.163*** 0.056 -0.356***
(0.055) (0.050) (0.056) (0.073) (0.079)
Married 0.100* -0.030 -0.122* -0.152* -0.196**
(0.056) (0.046) (0.066) (0.087) (0.082)
Social capital 
Group involvement 0.136*** 0.197*** 0.280*** 0.249*** 0.448***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Schmoozing -0.066 0.124*** 0.129*** 0.051 -0.063
(0.049) (0.031) (0.049) (0.071) (0.063)
Diversity of friendships 0.057*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.135*** 0.054***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Generalized trust 0.243*** 0.054 -0.170*** -0.287*** -0.271***
(0.056) (0.047) (0.060) (0.083) (0.089)
Random Effects 
City-level Variance ( t o o ) 0.232 0.412*** 0.296*** 0.418*** 0.262***
Intraclass correlation (p) 0.066 0.111 0.083 0.113 0.074
-2 x Log Likelihood 34935.418 41921.401 37385.236 33546.859 32987.497
° N=13,998; J=633. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
 ^Excluded category for race is “white”.
c Excluded category for income is “over S100K”.
 ^Excluded category for education is “graduate school”.
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Table D.4: The effect of social capital controlling for political institutions0
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Demo/boycott Pol. group
Fixed effects
Constant 1.466*** -0.539*** -1.826*** 2.947*** -2.932***
(0. 044) (0. 045) (0. 052) (0. 085) (0. 068)
Black6 0.108* -0.384*** 0. 137 -0. 129 -0.551***
(0. 057) (0. 068) (0. 089) (0. 105) (0. 093)
Asian -1.048*** -0.778*** -0. 120 -0.290* -0.583***
(0. 133) (0. 104) (0. 147) (0. 154) (0. 190)
Hispanic -0.519*** -0.533*** 0. 011 0. 106 -0.324***
(0. 091) (0. 079) (0. 098) (0. 126) (0. 120)
Age 0.093*** 0.037*** -0. 000 -0. 005 -0. 007
(0. 007) (0. 009) (0. 010) (0. 013) (0. 015)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0. 000 -0.000* -0. 000
(0. 000) (0. 000) (0. 000) (0. 000) (0. 000)
Under $20KC -0.434*** -0. 130 -0. 061 0.357** -0. 133
(0. 072) (0. 080) (0. 117) (0. 169) (0. 155)
$20-29,000 -0.327*** -0. 098 -0. 043 0.385*** -0. 104
(0. 084) (0. 088) (0. 114) (0. 135) (0. 167)
$30-49,999 -0. 021 0. 030 -0.159* 0.272** -0. 109
(0. 080) (0. 077) (0. 094) (0. 128) (0. 101)
$50-74,999 0. 062 0. I l l -0. 104 0.329** -0. 139
(0. 078) (0. 082) (0. 086) (0. 135) (0. 097)
$75-99,999 0. 133 0. 138 0. 040 0.240* -0. 012
(0. I l l ) (0. 085) (0. 089) (0. 131) (0. 127)
High school*1 -1.509*** -0.539*** -0.660*** -0.355** -1.022***
(0. 108) (0. 088) (0. 088) (0. 150) (0.144)
Some college -0.713*** -0.123* -0.236*** -0.215* -0.420***
(0. 093) (0. 067) (0. 073) (0. 118) (0. 102)
Bachelors -0. 061 -0. 075 -0. 117 -0. 137 -0.212**
(0. 095) (0. 076) (0. 079) (0. 140) (0. 099)
Female 0.228*** 0.164*** -0.163*** 0. 056 -0.356***
(0. 051) (0. 050) (0. 056) (0. 073) (0. 079)
Married 0.102* -0. 030 -0.122* -0.152* -0.196**
Social capital
(0. 054) (0. 046) (0. 066) (0. 087) (0. 082)
Group involvement 0.135*** 0.197*** 0.275*** 0.250*** 0.448***
(0. 012) (0. 010) (0. 014) (0. 016) (0. 017)
Schmoozing -0.069** 0.125*** 0.144** 0. 056 -0. 066
(0. 034) (0. 032) (0. 056) (0. 073) (0. 063)
Diversity of friendships 0.058*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.134*** 0.055***
(0. 012) (0. 011) (0. 014) (0. 019) (0. 016)
Generalized trust 0.248*** 0. 056 -0.147** -0.275*** -0.266***
Table continued on next page
(0. 050) (0. 053) (0. 064) (0. 091) (0. 089)
a N=13,998; J=633. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
 ^Excluded category for race is “white”.
c Excluded category for income is “over $100K”.
 ^Excluded category for education is “graduate school” .
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Table D .4 continued °
Parameter
Voting Petition Pol. meeting Demo/boycott Pol. group
Contextual effects 
Council size - 0.000 -0.020** 0.004 -0.004 - 0.000
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Mayor council6 0.018 -0.175 0.086 -0.423* -0.303
(0.095) (0.186) (0.167) (0.249) (0.191)
Council manager 0.144 -0.136 0.146 -0.056 -0.101
(0.136) (0.152) (0.140) (0.185) (0.139)
Fulltime mayor 0.005 0.105 0.200 0.443** 0.311*
(0.100) (0.127) (0.124) (0.162) (0.139)
Nonpartisan elections -0.102 0.064 0.096 0.016 -0.223**
(0.074) (0.104) (0.092) (0.117) (0.087)
Fulltime staff -0.061 -0.184** -0.008 -0.220* 0.121
(0.073) (0.083) (0.095) (0.119) (0.104)
Direct democracy0 -0.016 0.065** 0.014 0.074* 0.006
(0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.039) (0.031)
Taxes d 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percent owner occupied -0.009** - 0.000 -0.012*** -0.022*** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Unemployment rate 0.010 0.002 0.009 -0.061* 0.000
(0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.033) (0.022)
Median age 0.016* 0.008 0.005 0.030* 0.009
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Racial fractionalization -0.341 0.565 -1.377 0.080 1.965
(0.935) (1.032) (1.216) (1.508) (1.402)
Racial fractionalization2 -0.565 -0.846 1.193 -0.374 -2.894
(1.187) (1.360) (1.594) (1.902) (1.804)
Population density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population (logged) 0.054 0.060 -0.045 0.069 -0.069
(0.038) (0.046) (0.046) (0.056) (0.050)
Random Effects 
City-level Variance ( t o o ) 0.126 0.350*** 0.225*** 0.245*** 0.132**
Intraclass correlation (p ) 0.037 0.096 0.064 0.069 0.039
-2 x Log Likelihood 34908.387 41887.759 37357.931 33494.946 32956.079
a N=13,998; J=633. See Appendix for exact question wordings and coding; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a logistic model estimated using 
maximum likelihood in HLM; robust standard errors in parentheses.
 ^Excluded category for executive type is “commissioner” .
c Direct democracy is the sum of the following: initiative, referendum, recall and petition or 
protest referendum.
c Taxes measures the percentage of city revenue coming from taxation.
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